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Adversarial Failure
Benjamin P. Edwards*
Abstract
Investors, industry firms, and regulators all rely on vital
public records to assess risk and evaluate securities industry
personnel. Despite the information’s importance, an
arbitration-facilitated expungement process now regularly
deletes these public records. Often, these arbitrations recommend
that public information be deleted without any true adversary
ever providing any critical scrutiny to the requests. In essence,
poorly informed arbitrators facilitate removing public
information out of public databases. Interventions aimed at
surfacing information may yield better informed decisions.
Although similar problems have emerged in other contexts when
adversarial systems break down, the expungement process to
purge information about financial professionals provides a
unique case study.
Multiple interventions may combine to more effectively
surface information and generate better informed decisions. In
quasi-ex parte proceedings, traditional attorney ethics rules
must yield to a higher duty of candor. Yet adjudicators should
not rely on duty alone. Adversarial scrutiny may emerge by
designating an advocate to independently and critically engage
in circumstances where no party has any real incentive to oppose
an outcome. Ultimately, addressing adversarial failures may
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require a shift away from adversarial adjudication to a more
regulatory framework.
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Introduction

Customer complaints about stockbrokers (brokers),
misconduct findings, and other information have long been
public record. The public disclosures for Gregory Brian
VanWinkle, a broker affiliated with Essex Securities, reveal a
history of problems detailed in seven different disclosures. 1 In
2013, Securities America discharged him for violating the firm’s
policy related to client signatures. 2 Arising from this incident,
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) also
brought a disciplinary action against him which culminated in
a fine of $5,000 and a twenty-day suspension. 3 The public record
1. See Gregory Brian VanWinkle, BROKERCHECK, https://perma.cc
/KXP7-U53R (providing the employment history and public disclosure record
of VanWinkle).
2. See id. (detailing that VanWinkle was discharged due to an allegation
that he “violated firm policy relating to client signatures”).
3. See Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent No. 2013038209301
from Gregory Van Winkle to Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth. 2 (June 29, 2015), https://
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includes three customer disputes, two of which resulted in
settlements. 4 But these public disclosures only tell part of the
story.
VanWinkle erased another twenty-four customer disputes
and some now unknowable number of settlements from the
public record with one weird trick. In 2017, he filed an
arbitration claim against a former employer, IFS Securities. 5
IFS never responded to the action and did not file any answer. 6
Importantly, VanWinkle did not seek any damages from IFS
Securities. 7 He filed the action to secure an arbitration award
declaring that the twenty-four customer complaints should not
be on his record because they were either false or that he had
nothing to do with the alleged misconduct. 8 He succeeded and
obtained the arbitration award after a single fact-finding
hearing lasting four hours or less. 9

perma.cc/XA38-UTDV (detailing that VanWinkle agreed to “[a twenty]
business-day suspension from association with any FINRA firm in any
capacity and a $5,000 fine”).
4. See Gregory Brian VanWinkle, supra note 1 (reporting that one
customer dispute was denied and two other customer disputes were settled).
5. See VanWinkle v. IFS Sec., Inc., No. 17-02465, 2018 WL 4051277, at
*1 (Aug. 13, 2018) (Ver Beek, Arb.) (memorializing VanWinkle’s arbitration
claim).
6. See infra Part II.C.1.d and accompanying text (explaining why
brokerages do not oppose these requests); see also VanWinkle, 2018 WL
4051277, at *1 (noting that IFS “did not file with FINRA Office of Dispute
Resolution a properly executed [s]ubmission [a]greement” and that IFS “did
not participate in the expungement hearing”).
7. See VanWinkle, 2018 WL 4051277, at *1 (stating that VanWinkle’s
requested relief was only for “expungement of the [u]nderlying [c]laims from
his registration records maintained by the [Central Registration Depository]”).
8. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2080 (2009) (setting out the
requirements for expungement awards); see also VanWinkle, 2018 WL
4051277, at *2 (supporting VanWinkle’s expungement claim on the basis that
the underlying issues in the customer’s complaints were not VanWinkle’s fault
but rather the fault of the issuer of the security).
9. See VanWinkle, 2018 WL 4051277, at *2 (reporting that the arbitrator
found in favor of VanWinkle’s expungement argument). Within the FINRA
forum, a hearing session lasts for four hours or less. See Summary of
Arbitration Fees, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/9L8N-APY6 (“A
hearing session is any meeting between the parties and arbitrator(s) of four
hours or less, including a hearing or a prehearing conference.”).
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A traditional, adversarial fact-finding process may have
yielded a substantially different result. With no opposing voice
in the room, VanWinkle successfully shifted the blame to a third
party who played no role in the arbitration—an insurance
company who accurately described its offering in its
prospectus. 10 In granting VanWinkle’s request, the arbitrator
found that VanWinkle “sold a particular annuity product to
many customers” and that he “was familiar with this product
from sales meetings and prior sales to several customers.” 11
Implicitly acknowledging that VanWinkle did not understand
the product he sold, the arbitrator found that “[a]pparently the
issuer changed the [d]eath [b]enefit with nothing calling
attention to the change except language in a very long
prospectus.” 12 Ultimately, the arbitrator found that the
customer claims were false and that VanWinkle had not been
involved with the misconduct because the “fault lies with the
issuer, not [VanWinkle], and none of the allegations raised
involved actions by [VanWinkle].” 13 The award seemingly
acknowledges that VanWinkle either did not understand the
product he sold or that he sold it to customers while
misrepresenting its true nature. At best, the reasoning might
support a finding that VanWinkle repeated the same innocent
mistake at least twenty-four times. It does not establish that the
customer complaints about him were false.
The arbitrator’s ruling appears particularly puzzling
because customers work with brokers to help them find
financial products that are suitable for their situation. 14 This
requires that brokers like VanWinkle understand the products
that they sell to customers and not simply push whatever
10. See VanWinkle, 2018 WL 4051277, at *1 (noting that the parties
involved in the arbitration included VanWinkle and IFS Securities, a
broker-dealer, but did not include the insurance company who issued the
underlying annuity that was at issue in the case).
11. Id. at *2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2111 (2014) (obligating a broker to
“have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or
investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the
customer”).
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product pays the highest commission. 15 The rules governing
brokers make clear that a broker must have “an understanding
of the potential risks and rewards associated with the
recommended security or strategy” and that a broker who lacks
“such an understanding when recommending a security or
strategy violates the suitability rule.” 16 The arbitrator’s factual
finding about VanWinkle shows that he lacked that
understanding.
Many different stakeholders have an interest in these
disputes and could have pointed out obvious problems with a
broker selling dozens of customers the same variable annuity
without understanding its terms. State regulators rely on public
records to target their oversight and enforcement efforts.
FINRA, which oversees brokers, would likely want to know this
information when its staff examines a brokerage. Future
investors would likely want to know about these complaints
when deciding whether to hire him as a broker. And,
presumably, the annuity’s issuer might want to point out that
the broker and brokerage firm must understand the product it
sells. But none of these stakeholders participated in the
arbitration hearing. 17
The required final step of judicial confirmation of
arbitration awards provides no real check on the process. 18 Even
when regulators have attempted to intervene at this stage, they
have not generally succeeded at stopping confirmation. Courts
routinely confirm these arbitration awards without any inquiry
into whether the arbitrator made a reasonable decision. 19 A
15. Cf. Ann Lipton, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means,
BUS. L. PROF BLOG (May 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/N9NV-7USX (describing
variable annuities as “a product that might be suitable if you’re trying to
shelter your assets from a lawsuit, but otherwise one whose chief virtue lies
in its capacity to serve as a litmus test for the honesty of your broker”).
16. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2111 Supplementary Material .05(a)
(2014).
17. See VanWinkle v. IFS Sec., Inc., No. 17-02465, 2018 WL 4051277, at
*1 (Aug. 13, 2018) (Ver Beek, Arb.) (listing participating parties).
18. See id. at *2 (noting that before arbitration awards may be enforced,
they must be confirmed by courts of competent jurisdiction).
19. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 711 (1999)
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confirmed award allowed VanWinkle to have all this
information deleted from public records.
For decades, brokers and financial services industry firms
have used private arbitration decisions to strip information
from the public record. 20 In theory, this expungement process
provides an extraordinary remedy to protect financial
professionals from having malicious, false, or entirely baseless
complaints taint their records and harm their careers. 21 In
reality, significant evidence indicates that the expungement
process actually suppresses important public information and
tends to increase financial misconduct. 22 This may happen
either by allowing bad actors to remain or by emboldening
others to take advantage of clients. 23
Brokers win expungements quite frequently. By one
calculation, brokers have requested to expunge around 12
percent of the allegations of misconduct made by customers and
firms in recent years. 24 Brokers making these requests
generally succeed at suppressing information and win over 80
percent of their requests. 25 Notably, brokers who successfully
(“Courts do not closely review arbitration awards to ensure that arbitrators
apply the law. And even if a court discovers that an arbitration award does not
apply the law, the court will likely confirm the award.”(citation omitted)).
20. See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA.
L. REV. 785, 800 (2009) (noting that existing arbitration rules “facilitate the
concealment of allegations of misconduct”).
21. See Colleen Honigsberg, The Case for Individual Audit Partner
Accountability, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1914 (2019) (explaining that FINRA’s
“BrokerCheck . . . database includes unverified customer complaints,
prompting concerns that certain brokers are unfairly targeted”).
22. See Colleen Honigsberg & Matthew Jacob, Deleting Misconduct: The
Expungement of BrokerCheck Records, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 1) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
[hereinafter Honigsberg & Jacob] (reporting that brokers with past history of
successful expungements are more likely than brokers without past
expungements to engage in future misconduct).
23. See id. at 5 (“Our analysis provides evidence that successful
expungements increase recidivism.”).
24. See id. at 3 (explaining that evidence “suggests that brokers request
to expunge 12% of the allegations of misconduct made by customers and firms”
(citation omitted)).
25. See id. at 15 (“[O]ver 80% of expungements decided on the merits are
successful in each year from 2007 to 2016 . . . .”).
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expunge complaints from their record “are 3.3 times as likely to
engage in new misconduct as the average broker.” 26
The finding that brokers who have secured expungements
pose significantly more risk than the average broker raises real
concerns about the legitimacy of the expungement process itself.
Private arbitration proceedings may be particularly poorly
suited to resolve questions of great public importance. 27 If the
expungement process reliably functioned to remove only false
information, a broker who obtains an expungement award
would not pose any special danger. 28 Instead, the statistics
emerging from the current expungement process reveal that the
system likely purges truthful information, or at least
information with significant predictive power.
Many stakeholders have strong interests in knowing about
a broker’s disclosures. The broker’s current and future investor
clients have an interest in knowing about past customer
disputes, as well as bankruptcies and convictions. 29 Similarly,
regulators have an interest in the information to effectively
police their markets. Future employers also have an interest
because a record of past disputes may help a firm decide
whether a new hire will generate new liabilities. Yet the current
expungement process only requires the participation of a broker
and a brokerage firm. 30 Regulators are able to participate at the
confirmation stage, but rarely do. Customers whose disputes

26. Id. at 4.
27. Cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses
Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L.
REV. 87, 127 (2012) (“[O]ur system often relies heavily and explicitly upon
enforcement by private parties to achieve public regulatory objectives.”).
28. Theoretically, it might be possible that the brokers most likely to
harm the public were also the most likely to draw false allegations. This seems
highly unlikely.
29. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for
Effective Professional Disclosure, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457, 1485 (2017)
(“For market forces to function effectively, reputation must play a significant
role. Yet reputation only plays a weak role in the current markets for
professional services because public consumers both struggle to recognize and
broadcast information about low quality professionals.”).
30. See infra Part II.
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may have settled years ago may receive notice but have little
incentive to participate. 31
The current broker expungement process exemplifies
“adversarial failure.” In using the phrase, I mean more than
that the system simply does not work well. As Malcom Feeley
has noted, adversarial systems can fail in ways analogous to
market failures. 32 Although writing in the criminal law context,
he explains that although we “have theories and well-recognized
institutions to prevent or correct for market failure—public
finance theory, public utilities, regulatory agencies, and the
like—we have no equivalent safeguards for adversarial
failure.” 33
Adversarial failure may occur when parties to a dispute
have either aligned interests or no real incentive to contest.
Accustomed to adjudicating genuinely contested disputes,
arbitrators and courts mistakenly expect that the lawyers and
parties appearing before them will raise all relevant facts as
well as applicable law and rules. They may also expect that,
collectively, participating parties have some incentive to bring
reasonably pertinent information to the adjudicator’s attention.
Yet in many securities, shareholder, and mass tort disputes, the
named parties have little incentive to generate a complete
record. 34 Sometimes, no party to an action has any real interest

31. For a description of the limited notice customers receive in many
instances, see infra Part II.C.3 and accompanying text.
32. See Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform,
98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 704 (2018) (“Just as there is market failure at times, so
too there can be adversarial system failure.”).
33. See id. (describing the criminal law system as using “some crude
stop-gap measures, such as chronically underfunded public defender systems”
to address the problem).
34. See ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM
BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 107-09 (2019) (discussing how
settlement deals may emerge without significant information ever reaching a
court); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Publicly Funded Objectors, 19
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 48–49 (2018) (“On paper, things run like
clockwork. But practice suggests the need for tune-ups: some judges still
approve settlements rife with red flags, and professional objectors may be
more concerned with shaking down class counsel than with improving class
members’ outcomes.” (citation omitted)).
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in focusing a court’s attention on a significant issue. 35 Seeing
only what parties with aligned interests place before them,
adversarial systems chug along—blind to the real picture.
This Article connects with scholarly discussion in the
shareholder derivative and securities class action settlement
context. For the most part, scholars have highlighted problems
in the context of class action settlement approvals. 36
Principal-agent problems often occur when lawyers
representing named parties generally have interests which
align in favor of settlement approval, often to the detriment of
other key stakeholders and class members. 37 Normal
adversarial processes break down at this point because all of the
parties actually involved desire the same result—approval of
the settlement agreement. 38 After agreeing to pay a set price to
resolve all liability, defendants have no reason to pay lawyers to
point out any defects in the settlement agreement or plan of
distribution to the court. With significant fees on the table,
35. See Cathy Hwang & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Value of Uncertainty,
110 NW. U. L. REV. 283, 284–85 (2015) (explaining that “despite the fact that
some security holders may benefit from raising [a] jurisdictional issue and
possibly having the case dismissed, courts and parties have generally not
raised it” (citation omitted)).
36. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine
v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1126 (1995) (explaining
that in settlement approval hearings, “settling parties are aligned, and there
may be no objector represented at the fairness hearing. These proceedings are
thus analogous to ex parte proceedings, where a lawyer’s duty of candor to the
court is much greater than in an ordinary adversarial proceeding”); Susan P.
Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051,
1057–68 (1996) (describing class counsel taking advantage of absent class
members in class action settlements).
37. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) [hereinafter
Macey & Miller] (“[S]ettlement hearings are typically pep rallies jointly
orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel. Because both parties
desire that the settlement be approved, they have every incentive to present
it as entirely fair.”).
38. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 893 (Del. Ch.
2016) (“Once an agreement-in-principle is struck to settle for supplemental
disclosures, the litigation takes on an entirely different, non-adversarial
character. Both sides of the caption then share the same interest in obtaining
the Court’s approval of the settlement.”); see also supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
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plaintiffs’ lawyers have little incentive to encourage a court to
reduce their fees or carefully scrutinize how the agreement will
affect all unrepresented and absent class members. In many
instances, significant conflicts and flaws with a settlement deal
may never be brought to a court’s attention. 39 Yet little work
connects these threads to similar problems within the financial
regulatory system.
This Article explores how an adversarial system breaks
down and fails to produce informed decisions in a way that hurts
the public. It focuses on the process stockbrokers use to delete
public information. It begins in Part II by developing a detailed
case study about how brokers now leverage a private arbitration
process to enlist courts in suppressing public access to
information. Courts reviewing these arbitration awards
actually exercise little oversight. The Federal Arbitration Act
limits judicial review of arbitration awards, and only permits a
court to vacate an arbitration award in rare circumstances. 40 In
essence, poorly informed arbitration decisions now drain
important information from society without any real judicial or
adversarial check. 41 As with the problems in securities class
actions, skewed incentives, underrepresentation, and conflicts
amplify these recurring problems within the process for
expunging customer dispute information about stockbrokers.
Channeling disputes through arbitration proceedings only
serves to amplify these problems—leaving courts as an
ineffective check on arbitration outcomes. 42 In contrast,
39. See Benjamin P. Edwards & Anthony Rickey, Uncovering the Hidden
Conflicts in Securities Class Action Litigation: Lessons from the State Street
Case, 75 BUS. LAW 1551, 1552–53 (2020) (“[A]dversarial review of settlements
is rare, and no settling party has a reason to bring uncomfortable facts to the
attention of a reviewing court.” (citation omitted)).
40. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018) (setting out circumstances in which a court
may vacate an arbitration award).
41. See Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau: Consumer Arbitration as a Poster Child for Regulation, 48 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 343, 345 (2016) (explaining that “regulation is desirable . . . when market
forces are not sufficient to protect individual or public interests”).
42. Cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress
Towards Justice in Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 155, 159 (2019) (“If companies can continue to use mandatory
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ordinary judicial dispute resolution systems create some
restraint on adversarial failures. Public courts owe duties to the
public to correctly state the law and consider how the precedent
created will shape future cases. 43 In contrast, private
arbitrators often look no further than the materials submitted
to them by the parties. 44
To its credit, FINRA has periodically responded to problems
and imposed additional requirements. 45 In 2017 it considered
additional incremental reforms, including establishing a
dedicated arbitrator pool for expungements, requiring
unanimous approval from three arbitrators, imposing a
one-year time period for seeking expungements, and other
changes. 46 In 2019, FINRA’s Board of Governors
“approved . . . amendments to the Codes of Arbitration
Procedure to create, among other things, a roster of
arbitrators . . . to decide” expungement requests. 47 Although
these proposals have not yet been released, they will not solve
the core problems which flow from bad incentives and
conducting fact-finding through an arbitration process. At best,
they may mitigate the ongoing harm to a degree.

arbitration to eradicate access to court, where judges are potentially
influenced by social movements, social movements will no longer be able to
assist the overall progressive trend of our jurisprudence.”).
43. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J.
427, 432 (2018) (“Arbitrators and judges adjudicate disputes in different ways.
Precedent-creating judges owe a duty to the public to correctly state the law
because court judgments are public acts by public officials. This means that
judges will not simply regurgitate incorrect statements of law provided by the
parties.” (citation omitted)).
44. FINRA’s training materials for arbitrators instruct that “[a]rbitrators
should not make independent factual investigations of a case.” FIN. INDUS.
REG. AUTH., FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE 60
(May 2020), https://perma.cc/5W3F-NKXU (PDF).
45. For a discussion of past problems with the process, see infra Part II.D
and accompanying text.
46. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 17-42, Expungement of
Customer Dispute Information 5 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/K8U4-Q2WU
(PDF) (detailing updates to FINRA expungement rules and related arbitration
proceedings).
47. Robert W. Cook, Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, FIN.
INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/3H3M-UUE8.
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These failures reveal the need for a range of interventions
to produce better informed decisions. Part III considers some
possibilities. It proposes shifting resolution of these issues to a
non-adversarial and more regulatory process. Adjudicators
might also mitigate adversarial failures by adopting a more
skeptical approach or recruiting assistance when parties lack
incentives to develop and present important information. If an
adversarial system must be used, it also explores necessary
changes to the dominant ethical framework for lawyers
presenting information to decision makers. The American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides the
framework and operative text for most state professional ethics
rules. 48 Although Model Rule 3.3 generally calls for lawyers to
be candid with tribunals, the rules grant lawyers substantial
leeway to shape the factual scenarios adjudicators actually
see. 49 Changes to attorney ethics rules might cause lawyers to
present more balanced pictures.
II.

Expungement and Adversarial Failure

For decades, brokers have been able to leverage arbitration
proceedings to remove customer complaints from readily
accessible public records. 50 Brokers have long supported the
process because it gives them a path to challenge unverified
customer complaints. Yet the process does not sufficiently
protect the public’s interest in information. One arbitrator
generally criticized the way most expungements occur, pointing
out that many arbitration awards recommending expungement
“are not much more than conclusory reiterations of the findings
and not careful discussions and analyses of the evidence.” 51
Ultimately, the arbitrator recognized that many “decisions
suggest that the panel did little more than have a mini ex-parte

48. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
49. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(allowing lawyers to present information they suspect may be false or
incomplete).
50. For an explanation of FINRA’s role, see infra Part II.D.
51. Gilliam v. Sagepoint Fin., Inc., No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949, at
*3 (July 22, 2013) (Meyer, Arb.).
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trial on the merits,” resulting in expungements. 52 State
regulators have also panned this expungement process as “a
failed system.” 53 This case study details the broad context and
history surrounding the expungement process before examining
the many reasons why this adversarial expungement process
fails to generate informed or reliable decisions. At root, much of
the harm flows from the reality that this arbitration-facilitated
expungement system most substantively resembles an ex parte
proceeding cloaked in the form of an ordinary, adversarial
arbitration. In the end, the system now functions so poorly that
brokers receiving expungements pose over three times as much
danger to the public on a statistical basis than the average
broker. 54
Importantly, arbitration-facilitated expungements only
partially erase and blur history. Those in the know may find
expungement awards buried in FINRA’s database of publicly
available arbitration awards. 55 Although it is not possible to
reconstruct all expunged information, informed observers can
identify brokers who have had customer dispute information
deleted. Some informed observers may still take the fact of prior
expungements into account. Yet most ordinary regulatory,
arbitral, and judicial processes will not. After all, a court does
confirm an award before the customer dispute information is
actually deleted. 56

52. Id.
53. Letter from Christopher Gerold, N. Am. Sec. Admins. Ass’n
President, to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Mar.
18, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4 (finding that brokers with
expungements pose significantly greater risks than the average broker).
55. See Nicole G. Iannarone, Finding Light in Arbitration’s Dark
Shadow, 4 NEV. L.J.F. 1, 7 (2020) (“In the process of removing all information
concerning the customer’s dispute from her CRD, the broker asserts a claim
for expungement in the FINRA arbitration forum, the result of which is then
recorded as an award and publicly available . . . .” (citation omitted)).
56. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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The Broad Context

When Americans need help allocating funds and saving for
retirement, they often turn to financial advisors for assistance. 57
These advisors operate within a variety of regulatory structures
and may owe different duties depending on the particular
capacity in which they operate at any time. 58 And many brokers
operate in a dual capacity, sometimes acting as a fiduciary
investment adviser and a salesperson with the same customer.
The actual standards for investment advice continue to evolve,
and many financial advisors provide advice subject to
significant conflicts which often skew their advice toward more
expensive and underperforming options. 59 A financial advisor’s
prospective clients need accurate information to screen advisors
to protect themselves from conflicts of interest. Existing clients
need this information to determine whether to stay with a
broker or whether to investigate products the broker may have
previously sold them. This case study focuses on
brokers—commission-compensated salespeople affiliated with
brokerage firms. Although many of these brokers wear multiple

57. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 181, 213 (2017) (explaining that different “types of financial advisors now
play a major role in dispensing personalized investment advice and
influencing retail capital allocation”).
58. See Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented
Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47 (2014), and Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary
Duty and Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make a Material
Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105 (2014), for discussions of the divergent
standards governing financial advisors. Some have begun to turn to
automated investment advice platforms known as “roboadvisers” for
assistance. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment
Advice: Can Robo-Advisers Rescue the Retail Market?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
97, 98 (2018) (“Consumer interest in automated investment advice continues
to grow.”).
59. One well-known bias is toward recommending higher-fee, actively
managed mutual funds. See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence
and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 59 n.102 (2015) (likening the debate over active versus
passive investing to the debate over climate change because the debate
persists even though the relative underperformance of active management has
been conclusively established for decades).
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hats and also operate within other capacities, this case study
focuses on them as brokers.
Clients often struggle to monitor their broker’s performance
because of life cycle, behavioral, and innumeracy-related
reasons. Many Americans turn to financial advisers for
assistance at a time when they may be less capable of protecting
their own interests than ever before. Most ordinary savers
accumulate
retirement
savings
within
some
defined-contribution pension, such as a 401(k). Many savers
also have individual retirement accounts or taxable brokerage
accounts. As a saver approaches and enters retirement, she
faces an ever-increasing risk of cognitive decline. 60 In this
context, retiring savers stand to suffer enormous losses if they
entrust their assets to an unfaithful or inept manager.
Detecting mismanagement or exploitation may be especially
challenging for many Americans because Americans, as a whole,
exhibit low levels of basic financial literacy. 61 Despite this,
America’s securities law regime assumes that Americans will be
able to make sense of our disclosure-based regime for financial
products. 62 In reality, Americans generally struggle to
understand financial products and the obligations financial
services professionals actually owe to them. 63
The regulatory framework also aims to protect Americans
through significant oversight of industry actors. The federal
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) possesses broad
60. See ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2020 REPORT, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND
FIGURES REPORT 18 (2020), https://perma.cc/DM6M-MQDZ (PDF) (explaining
that that 10 percent of persons over 65, and 32 percent of persons over 85,
suffer from dementia).
61. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY
AMONG INVESTORS iii (2012), https://perma.cc/C6WZ-3SYQ (PDF) [hereinafter
SEC FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY] (documenting extensively widespread
financial illiteracy).
62. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Securities Law Implications of Financial
Illiteracy, 104 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018) (“[T]he federal securities law
regime is inextricably linked to financial literacy because the regime presumes
investors have the capacity to sufficiently understand the information being
disclosed to them and thus the capacity to make suitable investment choices
for themselves.”).
63. See Edwards, supra note 29, at 1462 (discussing “information
asymmetry between professional service providers and the public”).
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jurisdiction over the securities markets. 64 It also delegates
authority to FINRA, which “oversee[s] more than 634,000
brokers across the country,” and focuses on “protecting investors
and safeguarding market integrity in a manner that facilitates
vibrant capital markets.” 65
FINRA plays a unique role and bridges the gap between
business and government. As a financial self-regulatory
organization, FINRA operates with significant oversight from
the SEC. 66 It funds its own operations, primarily from member
dues. 67 Its members consist of broker-dealer firms—the same
entities it regulates. 68
FINRA also maintains a dispute resolution forum which
captures nearly all brokerage industry disputes. When disputes
between investors and brokers arise, mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements channel nearly all of those disputes into
FINRA’s dispute resolution forum. 69 FINRA remains responsive
to stakeholder concerns and has changed the rules governing its
arbitration process to address many of those concerns. 70
64. See FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/2QAA-8Q8E
(explaining that FINRA “work[s] under the supervision of the SEC”).
65. FINRA was formerly known as the National Association of Securities
Dealers. FINRA describes itself as a “government-authorized not-for-profit
organization that oversees U.S. broker-dealers.” About FINRA, FIN. INDUS.
REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/V2M2-BW47.
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2018) (prescribing the regulations for
“registered securities associations”).
67. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming A Fifth
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20 n.101 (2013) (describing FINRA’s funding).
68. See Andrew Stoltmann & Benjamin P. Edwards, FINRA Governance
Review: Public Governors Should Protect the Public Interest, 24 PIABA B.J.
369, 370 (2017) (describing FINRA’s governance structure).
69. See Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an
Investor Protection Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 171–72 (2016)
(“Today, in fact, most disputes between customers of broker-dealer firms and
the firms and their associated persons must be arbitrated through FINRA
Dispute Resolution . . . .”).
70. One 2008 study found investors were mostly dissatisfied with their
experience in the FINRA arbitration forum. See Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black,
When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of
the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 386 (2008)
(“An overwhelming 71% of customers disagreed with the positive statement
that ‘I am satisfied with the outcome,’ and only 22% of customers agreed with
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B.

BrokerCheck and the Underlying CRD Database

Investors and regulators may learn about complaints other
investors have lodged against brokers by reviewing information
about a broker on BrokerCheck, a website operated by FINRA. 71
BrokerCheck explains that it “is a free tool to research the
background and experience of financial brokers, advisers and
firms.” 72
Yet this tool has real limits. 73 Information available on
BrokerCheck comes from the Central Registration Depository
(CRD) and the Investment Adviser Registration Depository
(IARD), databases operated by FINRA and jointly owned by the
states. 74 The North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA) and FINRA developed the CRD to
consolidate regulatory processes. 75 It “contains the licensing and
disciplinary histories on more than 630,000 securities
professionals.” 76 Much of this information enters the database
when brokers file their licensing forms. NASAA has long held
that CRD records are state records because state regulations
direct brokerages to file forms with the CRD to register their

that statement.”); see also Teresa J. Verges, Evolution of the Arbitration
Forum as a Response to Mandatory Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 437, 439 (2018)
(“FINRA has made significant changes to its arbitration rules governing
customer disputes to better serve investors.”).
71. See BrokerCheck by FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc
/KRN3-245G (noting that BrokerCheck is operated and controlled by FINRA).
72. Id.
73. See Susan Antilla, The Unbelievable Story of One Broker and Her
Firm Fighting to Clean Her Tarnished Record, THE STREET (June 21, 2016,
11:14 AM), https://perma.cc/W7DH-8DB4 (“[A]nyone who does business with
a securities firm would be insane to assume that the stuff they read on Finra’s
online BrokerCheck tells the whole story.”).
74. See CRD & IARD Resources, N. AM. SECS. ADMINS. ASS’N, https://
perma.cc/2HCM-DN4G (providing informational resources regarding the CRD
and IARD).
75. See CRD at a Glance, N. AM. SECS. ADMINS. ASS’N, https://perma.cc
/TG43-LTQD (“Developed by NASAA and NASD (now FINRA) and
implemented in 1981, CRD consolidated a multiple paper-based state
licensing and regulatory process into a single, nationwide computer system.”).
76. Id.
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associated persons. 77 Courts also recognize that the CRD data
is “‘the joint property of the applicant, [FINRA], and those CRD
[s]tates.’” 78 State public records laws generally apply to
information contained in the CRD database. 79
The Exchange Act requires that some information from the
CRD database be freely available to the public and grants
FINRA discretion to decide the “type, scope, and presentation of
information to be provided” to the public. 80 FINRA exercises
discretion to curate BrokerCheck disclosures down to reveal
only a portion of the information contained in the full CRD. This
sanitization has drawn some criticism for obscuring too much
information. 81
Investors need access to information about brokers to
protect themselves. 82 FINRA recognizes that customer
complaint disclosures are useful in predicting future
77. See Letter from Joseph Borg, N. Am. Secs. Admins. Ass’n President,
to Barbara Sweeney, Sec’y Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers Regulation, Inc. (Dec. 31,
2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. E.g., Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 885 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting CRD Agreement Amendment) (emphasis in original removed)
(alteration in original).
79. See Advisory Legal Opinion from Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney
Gen. of Fla. to Robert F. Milligan, Comptroller of Fla. (Aug. 28, 1998)
(“[A]pplication and disciplinary reports maintained by the National
Association of Securities Dealers Central Registration Depository that are
used by the Department of Banking and Finance in licensing and regulating
securities dealers doing business in this state do constitute public
records . . . .”).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(i)(1)(C) (2018).
81. The Public Investors Advocate Bar Association (PIABA), criticized
FINRA in 2014 and in 2016 for providing limited information. See JASON R.
DOSS, CHRISTINE LAZARO, & BENJAMIN P. EDWARDS, THE INEQUALITY OF
INVESTOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION (Mar. 6, 2014), https://perma.cc/VSQ4-9L4T
(PDF); see also HUGH D. BERKSON & MARNIE C. LAMBERT, BROKERCHECK—THE
INEQUALITY OF INVESTOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION REMAINS UNABATED—AN
UPDATE TO PIABA’S MARCH 2014 REPORT 26 (2016), https://perma.cc/BC3HK4CP (PDF).
82. See Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Filing Related to
Changes to Forms U4, U5, and FINRA Rule 8312 No. 34–59916, 74 Fed. Reg.
23,750, 23,754 (May 20, 2009) (explaining that investors entrust brokers “with
their savings and should have sufficient pertinent information available to
enable them to select a registered representative with whose background they
are comfortable”).

1072

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2020)

misconduct. 83 One study by FINRA staff found “that
BrokerCheck information, including disciplinary records,
financial disclosures, and employment history of brokers has
significant power to predict investor harm.” 84 Since investors
cannot get complete information from BrokerCheck, the SEC
also encourages investors to seek information from state
regulators. 85
Expungement processes—discussed in greater detail in the
next subpart—remove information from the CRD database and,
consequently, it also disappears from the more broadly known
and accessible BrokerCheck website. 86 Importantly, this record
suppression likely harms even those public investors who would
have never personally conducted due diligence. Industry firms
may hire brokers without knowledge of past problems. Even if
they do become aware of past expungements, they have no way
to know the true merits of any past expunged complaint. In the
same way, deletion also inhibits regulators’ ability to protect the
public. 87
Ultimately, a well-functioning expungement process must
balance appropriate, competing interests. Although brokers will
generally prefer to minimize unflattering information about
themselves, they have a legitimate interest in removing
provably false and defamatory claims. But this interest must be
83. See Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule
Change to Amend FINRA Rule 8312 to Allow the Dissemination of IAPD
Information Through BrokerCheck No. 34–62468, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,502, 26,505
(May 4, 2020) (explaining that an inclusion of customer complaints in the CRD
system can help “increas[e] the ability of users to understand the potential
risk of misconduct” on the part of their brokers).
84. HAMMAD QURESHI & JONATHAN SOKOBIN, DO INVESTORS HAVE
VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT BROKERS? 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/S8QAVEHC (PDF).
85. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to Amend FINRA Rule
8312 (FINRA BrokerCheck Disclosure), 75 Fed. Reg. 41,254, 41,258 (July 15,
2010) (“The Commission urges the public to utilize all sources of information,
particularly the databases of the state regulators . . . .”).
86. See infra Part II.C.
87. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 14-31 Expungement of
Customer Dispute Information 2 (July 30, 2014) https://perma.cc/49B7-UGZ2
(PDF) (“Once information is expunged from the CRD system, it is permanently
deleted and, therefore, no longer available to the investing public or
regulators.”).
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balanced against the need for regulators to have access to past
complaints and for diligent investors to be able to gather
information before turning their life savings over to a broker.
The current process has drawn criticism for improperly
balancing these interests and broadly facilitating the removal of
information. 88
C.

Expungement Incentives and Process

Expungement processes have evolved substantially over
the years. After the CRD’s creation in 1981, FINRA would delete
information from the database after either an arbitration award
or a court decision called for it. 89 FINRA instituted a
moratorium on arbitrator-ordered expungements in 1999 after
state regulators expressed concern about the removal of
information from the CRD database that regulators contended
were state records without any court order directing removal. 90

88. A study by the PIABA Foundation found that FINRA’s “current
expungement process fails to properly balance the interests of investors,
regulators, and the public in the CRD maintaining complete and accurate
information about brokers against the interest of brokers in protecting their
reputations from false customer complaints.” JASON R. DOSS & LISA BRAGANÇA,
2019 STUDY ON FINRA EXPUNGEMENTS: A SERIOUSLY FLAWED PROCESS THAT
SHOULD BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PUBLIC
RECORD 7 (2019), https://perma.cc/9FSY-GJ6F (PDF).
89. See Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 01-65 Request for
Comment on Proposed Rules Relating to Expungement from the CRD 563
(Oct. 2001), https://perma.cc/CK26-BFZB (PDF) (requesting comment on
changing procedures).
90. See Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 99-09 Moratorium
on Arbitrator-Ordered Expungements from the CRD 47 (Feb. 1999), https://
perma.cc/7FDZ-8569 (PDF)
NASD Regulation has taken the position that expungement of
information from the CRD system that is ordered by an arbitrator
and contained in an award should be afforded the same treatment
as a court-ordered expungement. NASAA disagrees with this
position and has informed NASD Regulation that it does not believe
that arbitrator-ordered expungements should be afforded the same
treatment as court-ordered expungements.
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To resolve the issue, FINRA created a new process, now
codified under Rule 2080. 91 Under Rule 2080, brokers can
pursue relief two different ways, either by going directly to court
or by having a court confirm an arbitration award which
recommends expungement. 92 Rule 2080 requires brokers
seeking judicial assistance with an expungement to “name
FINRA as an additional party and serve FINRA with all
appropriate documents unless this requirement is waived.” 93
FINRA may waive the requirement to name it as a party if the
underlying customer claim is: (i) “factually impossible or clearly
erroneous;” (ii) the broker had no involvement in the conduct; or
(iii) the “claim, allegation or information is false.” 94 FINRA also
reserves the right to waive the requirement to name it as a party
under “extraordinary circumstances.” 95
When the SEC approved Rule 2080, it also contained the
requirement to name FINRA as a party to the court action
unless FINRA opted to waive the requirement. 96 The SEC
approved the framework because it believed “that the potential
involvement of [FINRA] at the court confirmation level will
provide greater safeguards than simple application of the rule
to members.” 97 As conceived, the system aimed “to shift final
authority on expungement away from arbitrators, and to courts
of law.” 98
91. See Seth E. Lipner, The Expungement of Customer Complaint CRD
Information Following the Settlement of a FINRA Arbitration, 19 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 57, 68–76 (2013) (tracing the early history of FINRA Rule
2080).
92. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2080 (2009) (“Obtaining an Order
of Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the Central
Registration Depository (CRD) System.”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The SEC first approved a nearly identical, earlier iteration of Rule
2080 issued by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
97. Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to Proposed NASD Rule 2130 Concerning the Expungement of
Customer Dispute Information from the Central Registration Depository
System No. 34–48933, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,667, 74,671 (Dec. 24, 2003).
98. Reinking v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., No. A-11-CA-813-SS, 2011 WL
13113323, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2011).
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Yet courts of law are not well-situated to constrain
expungements. A court may only vacate an arbitration award in
rare circumstances. 99 Both federal statutory law and precedent
leave courts unable to conduct any significant review of an
arbitrator’s decision absent rare circumstances. 100 Absent some
indication that the arbitrator was biased or otherwise refused to
listen to evidence, it remains extraordinarily difficult to prevent
an arbitration award from being confirmed in a court hearing.
Courts simply do not get into the weeds when reviewing
arbitration awards. Absent extraordinary circumstances, they
simply confirm them. 101
Now, most expungement hearings proceed under a mix of
official FINRA rules, guidance, and arbitrator training
materials. Because the critical fact-centric expungement
hearings occur within an arbitration forum, the public has little
or no access to information about the hearings. 102 Only in the
rarest circumstances will a court review the evidence considered
by an arbitrator before confirming an arbitration award.
Although most brokers pursue expungements through the
FINRA arbitration process before having a court confirm the
award, a few still attempt to go directly to court proceedings. 103
Courts divide over whether and how to consider these
direct-to-court filings. Some courts evaluating these requests
99. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018) (setting out circumstances where a court may
vacate an arbitration award).
100. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (“We now
hold that §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for
expedited vacatur and modification.”).
101. See, e.g., Walker v. Connelly, No. 100681/08, 2008 WL 4754138, at *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2008) (confirming arbitration award over opposition).
102. Notably, FINRA itself is not subject to the Freedom of Information
Act because it is not a government agency. A quirk in the law also exempts
information about the SEC’s oversight of FINRA from disclosure. See Pub.
Invs. Arbitration Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d 55,
72– 73 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 771 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[A]ll records relating
to the SEC’s examination reports—including reports relating to the
administrative functions of FINRA—are exempt from disclosure under the
FOIA.”).
103. See In re Lickiss, No. C-11-1986 EMC, 2011 WL 2471022, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. June 22, 2011) (“[A]s FINRA conceded at the oral argument herein, its
rules do not require a member or associated person to first present a request
to expunge to FINRA before going to court under Rule 2080(a).”).
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have sought to weigh the equities, balancing the public’s rights
against the broker’s interest to reach a decision. 104 Others have
declined jurisdiction on the theory that the broker already has
a remedy through the FINRA arbitration process. 105
1.

Incentives

Understanding
how
the
arbitration-facilitated
expungement process operates requires a sense about how
different incentives influence actors who participate within the
arbitration forum. These fundamental incentive problems bias
the expungement process toward facilitating the removal of
information from public records.
a.

Customers Have No Real Incentive to Participate

At the outset, it has long been clear that customers have
little incentive to oppose a broker’s request to expunge
information from public records. 106 Harmed customers have no
need to ensure that public information about the broker is
accurate once they have settled or otherwise resolved their
dispute. These customers already know to avoid the broker who

104. See Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 173, 180 (2012)
(instructing lower court to consider the equities in evaluating an expungement
request); see also Reinking, 2011 WL 13113323, at *2 (“[T]he Court finds (1) it
has the power to expunge a CRD record, and (2) the correct guiding standard
should be whether the disputed record has any regulatory value . . . .”).
105. See Aiguier v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., No. SUCV201602491BLS1,
2017 WL 1336579, at *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2017) (declining equity
jurisdiction over FINRA because it would “circumvent the arbitration
provisions that govern the resolution of claims that the plaintiff asserts
against NYLife. Accordingly, this court holds that it does not have jurisdiction
in equity to consider the plaintiff’s claim for expungement.”).
106. See Letter from Karen Tyler, N. Am. Secs. Admins. Ass’n President
and N.D. Sec. Comm’r, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 24,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (“[T]he claimant and
their counsel have no incentive to participate in the expungement hearing.
Quite the opposite is true. Claimants would incur additional costs, in the way
of attorney’s fees and time, in order to participate and would gain no benefit
through their participation.”).
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swindled them. Unsurprisingly, customers rarely appear to
contest a broker’s request for expungement. 107
At best, harmed customers may feel they have some civic
duty to protect the information if they understand the broader
systemic ramifications of a broker’s attempt to expunge
information. Yet aside from the dry pleasure of protecting the
integrity of public information, customers receive no real
benefits by opposing a broker’s expungement request.
Consider a customer’s financial interests. One court
recognized that “customers have no financial interest in the
outcome of [expungement] claims the plaintiff asserts in the
[c]omplaint and may well be disinterested in whether
BrokerCheck reports their complaints against him or not.” 108
Customers do not receive any additional compensation if they
successfully oppose a broker’s expungement request. In most
instances, customers will need the assistance of a lawyer to
mount any reasonable opposition to an expungement
request—and they should not be compelled to defend an
action. 109 Few lawyers will assist customers and oppose
expungements on a pro bono basis. Even if the customer could
find pro bono assistance, many would likely prefer to spend their
time doing other things than participating in arbitration
hearings where they will likely be called a liar.
Customers face little downside from spending their time on
more enjoyable activities. While customers may theoretically
face reputational risk if arbitrators deem their complaint “false”
and recommend that it be expunged, this will likely have no
real-world effect on them. When the customers are not parties

107. One study of over one thousand expungement awards found that
customers appeared only 13 percent of the time. See DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra
note 88, at 4.
108. Aiguier v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., No. 16-02491, 2017 WL
1311986, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2017).
109. See id.
[T]he court has grave concerns about naming a person as a
defendant in a case in which no claim is asserted against him/her,
thereby putting that person to the potential expense of retaining
counsel to explain the nature of the proceeding and what if anything
he/she must do in response to being served with a summons and
complaint.
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to the arbitration, the expungement awards do not ordinarily
even identify them by name. 110
b.

Weak Claimant Attorney Incentives

While the customer receives notice of the expungement
hearing, the attorney who represented that customer can only
learn of the expungement proceeding if the customer tells her.
Even when the attorney learns about a hearing, the attorneys
who regularly represent claimants in FINRA arbitration also
have little incentive to convince clients to aggressively oppose
expungement attempts. Most claimant attorneys take cases on
a contingency basis. Representing a client at an expungement
hearing usually requires a substantial amount of time and
preparation. After expending this effort, the claimant’s attorney
will not recover any funds if she successfully opposes an
expungement. Very few customers are willing to pay an attorney
fees to oppose an expungement request.
Still, claimants’ attorneys may have some incentive to
oppose expungements because they operate as repeat players in
FINRA arbitrations. A string of expungement awards finding
that they file “false” claims may hurt their reputations. They
may also have an interest in preserving information about past
claims to assist future clients. A claimant’s attorney may desire
to ask a broker about past complaints or use the information in
the CRD database to identify possible additional witnesses who
could testify about a broker’s behavior.
Ultimately, claimant attorneys who learn of an
expungement proceeding may hesitate to devote significant
resources to opposing the expungement request. Although
preserving information may benefit future clients, the
claimants’ bar is not monolithic. A lawyer who expends
resources to protect information from expungement may never
be positioned to use the information in a later arbitration
hearing because some other lawyer may represent future clients
who were harmed by the particular broker. In contrast, the

110. See, e.g. Loris v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 19-02661, 2020 WL 2494752, at
*1 (May 7, 2020) (Thompson, Arb.) (“[C]ustomer in Occurrence Number
1933223 (the ‘Customer’) was served with the [s]tatement of [c]laim.”).
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broker or brokerage firm will almost certainly benefit from
removing the information from the public record.
Securities arbitration clinics affiliated with law schools may
contain the only claimant attorneys with a real incentive to
oppose broker requests for expungement. 111 An expungement
hearing may provide an opportunity for a law student to both
protect the public and gain practical experience. Regrettably,
only about a dozen securities clinics exist and they rarely appear
in expungement hearings because the hearings may happen on
relatively short notice, making it difficult for clients to find the
pro bono clinics and for students to prepare.
c.

Brokers Have Strong Incentives to Seek Expungement

In contrast, brokers have strong incentives to seek
expungements. We know that brokers place substantial value
on expunging unflattering information because they regularly
pay lawyers to secure expungements. Public customer
complaints likely inhibit a broker’s ability to drum up new
business and continue to make money. Customers who do
review a broker’s record may pause if they see that other
investors have raised complaints.
Brokers may also seek expungement to reduce regulatory
pressure and scrutiny. FINRA’s enforcement process now
prioritizes “high risk” brokers and imposes its harshest
penalties on repeat offenders. 112 In particular, FINRA now
focuses special oversight on “high-risk brokers.” 113 Although it
does not disclose the precise method it uses to identify high-risk
brokers, FINRA has disclosed that its criteria include
settlements, customer complaints, disclosures, and proximity to

111. See Jill Gross, The Improbable Birth and Conceivable Death of the
Securities Arbitration Clinic, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 597, 600 (2014)
(describing securities arbitration clinics).
112. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining that the
FINRA disciplinary regime “imposes increasingly severe sanctions on repeat
offenders”).
113. See Melanie Waddell, Here’s How FINRA Defines a ‘High-Risk’
Broker, THINK ADVISOR (May 23, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://perma.cc/L8G8-BKQF
(describing FINRA’s assessment mechanisms to determine if a broker is
high-risk).
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other high-risk brokers. 114 The expungement process offers a
method to purge many of the identifying factors from a broker’s
record and possibly allow her to sink beneath the radar. 115 If
higher-risk brokers use the expungement process to avoid
scrutiny, it would explain one finding that brokers who have
received “expungements are 3.3 times as likely to engage in new
misconduct as the average broker.” 116
Negative information in a broker’s CRD creates real risk for
a broker facing a FINRA enforcement action. FINRA’s guidance
for sanctions instructs adjudicators to look for a pattern when
reviewing a broker’s record. 117 FINRA’s guidance explains that
adjudicators considering arbitration awards or settlements
“should rely on the CRD description of the amount of the award
or settlement.” 118 Within the disciplinary proceeding at least,
“parties are precluded from challenging the arbitration award
or contesting the CRD description of arbitration settlements.” 119
Expunging information from the CRD may reduce the broker’s
exposure to recidivism-related enhancements in disciplinary
sanctions. 120
Brokers may also pursue expungements because a clean
record may help a broker remain at higher-tier industry firms.
Remaining affiliated with a marquee firm grants status and
often greater access to more profitable high net-worth

114. See id. (stating that FINRA looks at a broker’s “settlements,
complaints, disclosures, employment history/termination history, exam
attempts, geography . . . [and] individuals who associate with high-risk
brokers”).
115. Although it has not disclosed that it does so, FINRA might keep a log
of brokers with expungements for use in identifying higher risk brokers.
116. Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4.
117. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA SANCTION GUIDELINES 3 (Mar.
2019), https://perma.cc/8K49-LYZY (PDF) (“Adjudicators should draw on their
experience and judgment when evaluating if a respondent’s [d]isciplinary and
[a]rbitration [h]istory establishes a pattern.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4 (“[I]f brokers are abusing
the expungement process, . . . removing misconduct from BrokerCheck
will . . . hamper the effectiveness of FINRA’s disciplinary regime, which
imposes increasingly severe sanctions on repeat offenders.”).
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investors. 121 One recent economics paper found that brokers
with records of misconduct tend to migrate from higher-tier to
lower-tier industry firms. 122 Higher-tier brokerage firms
seemingly care more about their reputations and keep discipline
by deciding not to employ brokers with misconduct records. 123
In essence, a broker may be able to enhance her chances of
staying at or migrating to a higher-tier firm by securing an
expungement.
d.

Brokerage Firms Have Little Incentive to Oppose

In expungement-only cases, brokers seeking expungements
often name their current or former employers as respondents. 124
Importantly, brokerage firms have little incentive to oppose a
broker’s expungement request and may actually benefit if the
broker secures an expungement. 125 One recent study of over a
thousand arbitration awards involving expungements found
that brokerage firms “did not object or otherwise oppose the
individual broker’s expungement request . . . over 98% of the
time.” 126
Brokerage firms typically benefit when their current and
former brokers secure expungements because it lowers their
121. See Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for
Financial Adviser Misconduct, 127 J. POL. ECON. 233, 275 (2019)
(“[D]efrauding large investors may be more profitable, since they have more
wealth.”).
122. See id. at 237 (explaining that the firms that hire brokers with
misconduct records “are less desirable and offer lower compensation”).
123. See id. at 236 (“Firms, wanting to protect their reputation for honest
dealing, would fire advisers who engage in misconduct. Other firms would
have the same reputation concerns and would not hire such advisers.”).
124. See Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement
Guidance, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/VC8L-5YEV (last updated
Sept. 2017) (“In some instances, an associated person will file an arbitration
claim against a member firm solely for the purpose of seeking expungement,
without naming the customer in the underlying dispute as a respondent.”).
125. See Lisa Bragança & Jason Doss, How Expungement-Only Cases Are
“Gamed, Exploited and Abused” by Brokers, FIN. PLAN. (Oct. 29, 2019, 11:48
AM), https://perma.cc/RH4T-EH58 (“Since brokers and their brokerage firms
both have an interest in erasing customer complaints from the brokers’
records, they are rarely in opposition to each other.”).
126. Id.
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regulatory profile and reduces their reputation and litigation
risks. 127 FINRA imposes additional obligations on firms
employing brokers with “a recent history of customer
complaints, disciplinary actions involving sales practice abuse
or other customer harm, or adverse arbitration decisions.” 128
Implementing heightened supervisory procedures for brokers
with checkered pasts costs firms money and may expose them
to additional liability if the broker harms another customer or if
the firm fails to set up adequate enhanced supervision. 129
FINRA tells its firms that they should consider, among other
things, “a pattern of unadjudicated matters, such as
unadjudicated customer complaints” in determining whether to
implement heightened supervision for a particular broker. 130
Successful expungements may cause a “pattern” to disappear
from the regulatory record, removing the need for heightened
supervision.
One rare unsuccessful expungement attempt showcases
how a brokerage firm’s interest generally aligns with a broker’s
interest. In 2019, Paul Douglas Larson named brokerage firm
Larson Financial Securities, LLC as a respondent in an
arbitration where he sought an expungement. 131 BrokerCheck
reveals that the managing member of Larson Financial
Securities, LLC is Larson Financial Holdings, LLC. 132 A
disclosure form for an affiliated entity reveals that Paul Douglas

127. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 6 (recognizing that
brokerage firms care more about public, rather than private, misconduct).
128. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 18-15 Guidance on
Implementing Effective Heightened Supervisory Procedures 2 (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://perma.cc/UB23-PYRE (PDF) (discussing heightened supervision
requirements).
129. See id. at 3 (“The failure to assess the adequacy of its supervisory
procedures in light of an associated person’s history of industry or
regulatory-related incidents would be closely evaluated in determining
whether the firm itself should be subject to disciplinary action for a failure to
supervise.”).
130. Id.
131. Larson v. Larson Fin. Secs., LLC, No. 19-02660, 2020 WL 2494751,
at *1 (May 5, 2020) (Matek, Arb.).
132. Larson Financial Securities, LLC, BROKERCHECK, https://perma.cc
/R4DX-FWZZ.
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Larson is a control person for Larson Financial Holdings. 133 In
essence, Paul Douglas Larson filed an arbitration against an
entity he controls, and somehow managed to defy the odds and
lose. 134 The loss might be attributable to unnamed customers
who “filed submissions in opposition to the request for
expungement.” 135 Notably, one customer actually “appeared at
the expungement hearing” and counsel for the customers
“appeared at all of the hearings on expungement and opposed”
the request. 136
e.

Arbitrator Selection Pressure

Arbitrators within FINRA’s forum also face incentives to
facilitate expungement requests. FINRA’s arbitrators serve as
independent contractors and are paid by the number of hearing
sessions they conduct. 137 Although an arbitrator might request
additional information and conduct additional, lengthy hearing
sessions for expungement requests, the arbitrator would likely
only get to do this once. 138 Critically, repeat business for
arbitrators depends on being selected to conduct arbitrations
and only the named parties have any say in the arbitrator
selection process. 139 An arbitrator who denies expungement
requests will likely stop receiving expungement cases.
When a broker seeking an expungement files a FINRA
arbitration against an employer, both the broker and the
employer will participate in FINRA’s arbitrator selection
133. LARSON FIN. GRP., LLC, FORM ADV, CRD NUMBER: 140599 28–29
(2020), https://perma.cc/79EA-RFGN (PDF).
134. Larson, 2020 WL 2494751, at *1.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13214 (2019).
138. See Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The
Lessons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L.
REV. 463, 507–08 (2018) (“Arbitrators also have financial incentives to favor
employers who, unlike employees, are in a position to hire the arbitrator again
in the future.”).
139. Cf.
Bradley
A.
Areheart,
Organizational
Justice
and
Antidiscrimination, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1921, 1945 (2020) (“[E]mployers, as
‘repeat players,’ can choose arbitrators that have been known to rule in favor
of other employers.”).
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process. 140 To reduce costs and trigger a proceeding with a single
arbitrator, brokers have been filing these actions with a claim
for $1.00 in nominal damages, a practice FINRA recently moved
to constrain. 141 To select the single arbitrator who will hear the
case, FINRA first provides a list of ten names to the claimant
and the respondent. 142 Both the claimant and the respondent
may each strike up to four arbitrators from the list and rank the
remaining arbitrators. 143 If both the claimant and the
respondent
favor
arbitrators
who
routinely
grant
expungements, an arbitrator who occasionally rejects an
expungement request may be less likely to be selected. 144
Some evidence suggests that parties in expungement-only
cases prefer arbitrators who routinely grant expungements. A
recent study by the PIABA Foundation found that the three
arbitrators most frequently selected for expungement-only
cases “granted expungement requests over 95% of the time.” 145

140. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA’S DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 3
(2012), https://perma.cc/93BS-29ZT (PDF) (“Both sides are allowed to remove
or strike some of the arbitrators on the list of consideration and to rank the
remaining names in order of their preference.”).
141. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend the FINRA
Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and the FINRA Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes to Apply Minimum Fees to
Requests for Expungement of Customer Dispute Information, 85 Fed. Reg.
11,165, 11,167 (Feb. 26, 2020) (“FINRA is aware that associated persons who
file a straight-in request often add a small monetary claim (typically, one
dollar) to the expungement request to reduce the fees assessed against the
associated person and qualify for an arbitration heard by a single arbitrator.”).
142. See Arbitrator Selection, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc
/MF44-TY7M (“For claims of up to $100,000, the parties receive one list of 10
chair-qualified non-public arbitrators . . . . For claims of more than $100,000
for unspecified or non-monetary claims, the parties receive two lists (one
including 10 non-public chair-qualified arbitrators, and one including 20
non-public arbitrators).”).
143. Id.
144. See David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 217 (2019) (“[A]rbitrators face incentive structures to
not depart from the parties’ settled expectations, and are not rewarded,
reputationally or otherwise, for issuing public-facing rulings.”).
145. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 4.
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Weak Institutional Oversight Incentives

FINRA also faces institutional constraints limiting its
ability to vigorously protect information contained in the
CRD. 146 Critically, reviewing and challenging arbitration
awards in court would consume substantial time and resources.
My search revealed 935 different arbitration awards involving
expungement in 2019 alone. Effective review and oversight
would likely require substantial independent investigation,
something FINRA never committed to do when it agreed to
create and manage the CRD database. Although FINRA has
responded to criticisms of its expungement process and made
significant reforms over the years, it has not generally led
efforts to protect information contained in the CRD. 147 Its
members may also not push FINRA to lead efforts to preserve
the public availability of unflattering information about
brokers. 148
2.

Arbitrator Fact-Finding in Expungement Hearings

There are two different routes to an expungement hearing
within FINRA’s arbitration forum, either at the conclusion of a
customer arbitration or in a separate arbitration without
naming the complaining customer as a party. Brokers named as
parties to a customer arbitration “may request expungement
during that arbitration, but [are] not required to do so.” 149 In
practice, many brokers have waited “years after FINRA closed

146. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U.
CIN. L. REV. 573, 608 (2017) (“[S]elf-regulatory bodies may be particularly
lethargic protectors in situations where actions in the public’s interest would
undercut private profits.”).
147. See Mason Braswell & Jed Horowitz, Top Merrill Broker Patrick
Dwyer Leaves Amid Accusations, ADVISORHUB (Aug. 22, 2019), https://
perma.cc/7YKF-5GGM (describing FINRA’s move to block confirmation of an
arbitration award directing expungement as a “rare step”).
148. See, e.g., Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 7 (describing a human
resources office’s decision to ignore allegations of an employee’s misconduct
until that misconduct became public).
149. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 17-42 Expungement of Customer
Dispute Information 5 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/HB2Z-YAV3 (PDF).

1086

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2020)

the Underlying Customer Case” to request expungement. 150
Troublingly, these delays often mean that important evidence
and witnesses have been lost to the passage of time. 151
Adversarial failure explains many stale expungements.
Under the arbitration forum’s rules, brokers should face at least
some challenge pursuing an expungement through FINRA
arbitration after more than six years from the time the
information appeared in the CRD database. 152 FINRA’s rules
explain that its arbitration forum may only be used within six
years of the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim. 153
Despite this, arbitrators regularly expunge information dating
back 20 years or more. 154 Arbitrators may not apply—or even
consider—the eligibility rule because no party to the arbitration
points out that the dispute may no longer be eligible to be heard
in the FINRA forum. 155 Of course, arbitrators may interpret the
rule in some way allowing access to the forum, but it appears
odd that arbitrators do not regularly even consider the issue
when presented with stale expungement requests.

150. Id.
151. See id. (“Given the length of time between case closure and filing of
the request, in many of these instances, the customers cannot be located and
any documentation that could explain what happened in the case is not
available or cannot be located.”).
152. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13206 (2011) (explaining that in
industry disputes “[n]o claim shall be eligible for submission to arbitration
under the Code where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event
giving rise to the claim”).
153. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12206 (2011) (directing that in
customer disputes “[n]o claim shall be eligible for submission to arbitration
under the Code where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event
giving rise to the claim”).
154. See Rosenberg v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, No. 19-02801, 2020 WL
2494754, at *2 (May 8, 2020) (Mintzer, Arb.) (recommending expungement
where the underlying information “was received by Respondent on July 17,
2000 and solely alleged ‘breach of fiduciary duty’ concerning an ‘Equity Listed
(Common & Preferred Stock)’”).
155. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12206 (2011) (placing responsibility
for determining eligibility on the party who submits the claim, not the
arbitrator).

ADVERSARIAL FAILURE

1087

Notably, the current rules do not require brokers to make
the complaining customer a party. 156 Brokers will frequently file
their action against a current or former employer and provide
notice to a customer shortly before the final evidentiary
hearing. 157 Brokers name their employers on the theory that the
employers were the ones who actually reported the information
to the CRD. 158 These expungement-only arbitrations have
dramatically increased in recent years. The PIABA Foundation
found that expungement-only cases increased “924% from 2015
to 2018.” 159
The trend has continued since that time. Consider one
recent arbitration award recommending expungement. 160
Steven Phillip Margulin sued his current employer, Centaurus
Financial, Inc., “seeking expungement of a customer complaint”
and relying on evidence from 2003—seventeen years ago. 161 In
responding to Margulin’s complaint, “Centaurus stated that it
does not oppose” the “expungement request.” 162 Margulin
provided notice to the estate of the deceased customer on
February 21, 2020, and a telephonic hearing was held
thirty-three days later on March 25, 2020. 163 The arbitrator
granted the request and recommended that the customer
dispute information be expunged from the CRD database,

156. FINRA’s training materials for its arbitrators note that brokers may
“file an arbitration claim against a member firm solely for the purpose of
seeking expungement, without naming the customer in the underlying dispute
as a respondent.” FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA OFFICE OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING 14 (2016), https://perma.cc/NLE2-6657
(PDF) [hereinafter EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING].
157. See id. (“[A]rbitrators should order the associated persons to provide
a copy of their Statement of Claim to the customer(s) involved in the
underlying arbitration.”).
158. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 4530 (2015) (requiring the firm to
report broker misconduct).
159. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 3.
160. See Margulin v. Centaurus Fin., Inc., No. 19-01639, 2020 WL
1943589, at *3 (Apr. 17, 2020) (Tindall, Arb.) (recommending “the
expungement of all references to the Underlying Complaint”).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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finding that the information was “false.” 164 Once Margulin
confirms the award in court, the information will be deleted
from the CRD database. Yet, if asked, an arbitrator might have
found this expungement request ineligible for arbitration under
FINRA’s Rules because the dispute was over six years old. 165
With limited information and briefing, arbitrators regularly
make critical factual findings bearing on whether past customer
complaints should be expunged from the public record. Today,
arbitrators must at least hold hearings before granting
expungement requests. 166 FINRA explains that arbitrators
should only recommend expungement of customer dispute
information from the public record “when the expunged
information has no meaningful regulatory or investor protection
value.” 167
The process has evolved over time as FINRA has
implemented change after change to address known problems.
When past guidance directing arbitrators to make findings did
not generate consistent affirmative findings by arbitrators,
FINRA amended its code. 168 Both FINRA Rule 12805 (customer
disputes) and Rule 13805 (industry disputes) now “establish
specific procedures that arbitrators must follow before ordering
expungement of customer dispute information from the CRD
system.” 169
Arbitration awards recommending expungement must
contain specific findings. 170 Although arbitrators do not
164. Id.
165. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13206 (2011) (“No claim shall be
eligible for submission to arbitration under the Code where six years have
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.”).
166. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12805 (2009); id. RULE 13805.
167. Frequently Asked Questions about FINRA Rule 2080 (Expungement),
FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/D7WW-APB2 [hereinafter FAQ
About FINRA Rule 2080].
168. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 08-79 Expungement 1 (Dec.
2008), https://perma.cc/ZTX7-3QPZ (PDF) (describing changes to FINRA’s
procedural codes for both customer and industry disputes).
169. Id. at 2.
170. See FAQ About FINRA Rule 2080, supra note 167 (“Arbitrators
considering expungement relief are required to complete training provided by
FINRA Dispute Resolution regarding . . . the requirement to make specific
findings if they decide that expungement is appropriate.”).
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ordinarily have to explain any basis for their decisions, FINRA
Rule 12805 and 13805 require the arbitrator to “indicate in the
arbitration award which of the Rule 2080 grounds for
expungement serves as the basis for its expungement order.” 171
For example, an arbitrator might find that a broker had no
involvement in a customer complaint or that it was false
because the broker did not even work at the firm at the time of
the alleged misconduct. 172 It also requires arbitrators to
“provide a brief written explanation of the reason(s) for its
finding that one or more Rule 2080 grounds for expungement
applies to the facts of the case.” 173 In approving the rule change,
the SEC found that “additional procedures, such as the required
review of settlement documents, and the written explanation of
the regulatory basis and reason for granting expungement, in
the proposed rule are designed to help assure that the
expungement process is not abused.” 174 The SEC also
encouraged FINRA to “use its authority to review expungement
requests to ensure that expungement is an extraordinary
remedy.” 175
FINRA’s training materials instruct the arbitrators
crafting these findings. They explain that the “written
explanation should provide regulators and other interested
parties with additional insight into why the arbitrators
recommended expungement and any facts and circumstances
they found in support of the recommendation.” 176 While the goal
of the rule change was to ensure that arbitrators were
recommending expungement selectively as an “extraordinary
remedy,” that appears not to have happened. 177 Arbitration
171. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12805(c) (2009); id. RULE 13805(c).
172. See id. RULE 2080 (“Upon request, FINRA may waive the obligation
to name FINRA as a party if FINRA determines that . . . the registered person
was not involved in the alleged investment-related sale practice violation.”).
173. Id. RULE 12805.
174. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of
Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,086, 66,089
(Nov. 6, 2008).
175. Id. at 15.
176. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 16.
177. Id. at 8.
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awards recommending expungement are more prevalent than
before and generally do not show evidence of having considered
any evidence against expungement. 178
3.

Customers Receive Inconsistent and Limited Notice

No FINRA Rule now requires a broker to provide notice to
a former customer about an expungement hearing. 179 The rules
also do not require any notice to the securities regulators in
states where the broker holds a license. The “requirement” to
provide notice appears in the arbitrator training materials,
which explain than an arbitrator must “order the associated
persons to provide a copy of their Statement of Claim to the
customer(s).” 180 FINRA emphasizes that “without this directive
from the arbitrators, the customer(s) may not even be aware
that an expungement claim is pending regarding their prior
dispute.” 181
a.

Arbitrators Do Not Always Require Notice

Despite guidance instructing them to require notice be
given to former customers, arbitrators do not always actually
require that customers receive notice. In some instances,
customers receive no notice before arbitrators hold hearings to

178. See DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 125 (“But today, the floodgates are
wide open and the number of expungement cases filed by brokers against their
brokerage firms has risen nearly 1,000% in the last four years.”).
179. Although FINRA’s Board of Governors approved codifying its
expanded expungement guidance in 2018, it has not yet codified the guidance.
See Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Dec.
21, 2018), https://perma.cc/9CUE-FVVL (“The Board approved proposed
amendments to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure for Customer and Industry
Disputes to codify the Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded
Expungement Guidance and modify the fees for small claim expungement.”).
180. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 14.
181. See id. (elaborating that “notice provides the customer(s) with the
opportunity to advise the arbitrators and parties of their position on the
expungement request, which may assist arbitrators in making the appropriate
finding under Rule 2080”).
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determine whether to recommend expungement. 182 This may
occur when counsel for a party argues for some idiosyncratic
interpretation of FINRA’s guidance. For example, in one
arbitration, the attorney argued that he did not need to provide
notice to three different customers because “it was his position
that the notification requirements of an expungement request
applies to customers who have filed for arbitration.” 183 The
arbitration panel agreed. 184
b.

Short Notice Windows

Determining actual notice times remains difficult.
Arbitration awards do not always reveal the date on which a
broker seeking expungement notifies a former customer that a
hearing will be held. For example, Mark Kravietz procured an
arbitration award recommending that customer information be
expunged from public records on May 1, 2020. 185 Although the
award does not reveal the date on which notice was sent to the
customer, Kravietz provided FINRA with an Affirmation of
Service on or about April 9, 2020, before a telephonic hearing
was held on April 28, 2020, just nineteen days later. 186
Unsurprisingly, the award found that the “underlying customer
did not participate in the expungement hearing and did not
oppose the request for expungement.” 187
Although arbitrators do not seem to aggressively police
notice periods, they may balk at egregiously short periods. In
one instance, an arbitrator postponed an expungement hearing
on account of inadequate notice. 188 The broker had transmitted
182. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No.
16-02781, 2017 WL 3189311, at *1 (July 20, 2017) (Ainbinder, Thorpe, &
Santillo, Arbs.) (recommending expungement of six customer complaints even
though the broker made no attempt to notify three of the customers).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Kravietz v. U.S. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 20-00601, 2020 WL 2235746, at
*1 (May 1, 2020) (Lascar, Arb.).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Papadopoulos v. Lasalle Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 17-01201, 2018 WL
1452616, at *2 (Mar. 16, 2018) (Murphy, Arb.) (“The Arbitrator postponed the
expungement hearing due to inadequate notice.”).
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notice of the hearing “via priority express mail notice” just three
days before the hearing. 189
FINRA’s expungement training materials do not specify
that notice must go out any particular number of days before a
hearing may be held. 190 While there are FINRA Rules specifying
dates for motions and responses in its forum, the time period for
a customer to receive notice remains undefined. 191 This also
contrasts with the law for class action settlement approvals
which require notice to be sent to important stakeholders both
within ten days after any proposed settlement is filed and at
least ninety days before a court can grant approval. 192 Notice
norms in expungement cases fall far short of the usual sixty-day
period under the federal rules for a defendant to respond to a
complaint after waiving service or for a defendant to respond to
a statement of claim within the FINRA arbitration forum. 193
c.

Vague and Discouraging Notice Language

Neither FINRA’s expungement guidance nor its arbitrator
training materials require the notice to be provided in any
particular form, leaving self-interested parties free to craft
notice language in ways seemingly calculated to suppress
customer participation. For example, consider the notice
language used in one letter sent to notify a customer of about an
expungement hearing. 194 The letter opens with legalese, stating
that “[p]ursuant to FINRA’s Published Guidance, ‘Notice to
Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement Guidance,’
we are notifying you that a request for customer dispute
189. Id.
190. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 14.
191. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13503(a)(3) (2017) (“Written
motions must be served at least 20 days before a scheduled hearing, unless
the panel decides otherwise.”).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b), (d) (2018).
193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3) (“A defendant who, before being served with
process, timely returns a waiver need not serve an answer to the complaint
until 60 days after the request was sent—or until 90 days after it was sent to
the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States.”).
194. Letter from Dochtor D. Kennedy, President & Founder, Advisor Law,
LLC to Dan Tennent (Dec. 31, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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expungement relief has been filed in the aforementioned
case.” 195 The letter seems calculated to discourage, stating that
“[y]ou are not a party to this case and are under no duty or
obligation to answer, respond, participate or engage in any
manner.” 196 Although the letter does reveal the date and time of
the hearing, it does not tell the recipient where it is or how to
actually participate in these primarily telephonic hearings. 197 A
motivated, proactive customer would have to take additional
steps to gather more information in order to participate.
Importantly, customer participation provides extraordinary
value to an arbitration panel considering an expungement
request. When a customer does not participate, an arbitration
panel will often receive no evidence to contradict a broker’s
testimony. 198 A notice seemingly calculated to discourage their
participation increases the likelihood that an arbitrator will
later render a poorly informed decision. 199
4.

Unclear Standards of Proof

Identifying how these grounds should be interpreted or
what standard of proof an arbitrator should apply in reviewing
an expungement request remains difficult. Arbitrator training
materials do not contain any reference to common standards of
proof such as by a “preponderance” of the evidence, by “clear and
convincing” evidence, or “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 200 One
arbitrator concluded that the standard surely must be higher
than a preponderance of the evidence because FINRA does not
remove a customer complaint if the customer does not prevail in
arbitration under an ordinary preponderance standard of civil
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Royal All. Assocs. v. Liebhaber, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 813
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“[N]o evidence was presented or information not disputed
[sic] because the arbitrators did not allow Ms. Liebhaber to present any
evidence at the hearing despite her appearance and multiple requests to do
so.”).
199. See id. (describing how the arbitrators prevented the client from
presenting evidence at the hearing).
200. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156.
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proof. 201 The arbitrator recognized that if an “allegation is
supported by some reasonable proof, even short of
‘preponderance,’ it cannot be said to be ‘false.’ Unfortunately,
too many decisions improperly label ‘false’ claims simply
because they were not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.” 202
Despite this reasoning, most arbitrators seemingly apply a
preponderance standard to recommend expunging significant
information after a quick, one-sided hearing where only the
broker seeking expungement presents any evidence. 203 Consider
a recent arbitration award recommending the expungement of
twelve different items from the CRD for two brokers. 204 The two
brokers brought an arbitration against Geneos Wealth
Management, Inc., which “did not appear at the expungement
hearing and did not contest the expungement requests.” 205 The
arbitrator found that “the Customers were served with the
Statement of Claim and received notice of the expungement
hearing” at some unspecified date before the hearing. 206 At a
hearing where only the brokers appeared, the arbitrator found
that “preponderance of the evidence adduced at the
expungement hearing” supported a series of factual findings. 207
Altogether, the brokers successfully erased “five FINRA
arbitration cases, [one] civil court case and two customer
complaints” from the CRD. 208 The arbitrator reached this

201. See Gilliam v. Sagepoint Fin., Inc., No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949,
at *2 (July 22, 2013) (Meyer, Arb.) (“[The customer] failed to prove his/her case
by a preponderance of the evidence . . . the allegations nevertheless appear on
the respondents’ CRD records . . . . From this it may be inferred that to
expunge . . . something more than a preponderance of the evidence is
required.”).
202. Id. at *3.
203. See, e.g., Royal All. Assocs., 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 813 (discussing the
one-sided evidence presented at the hearing).
204. Arford v. Geneos Wealth Mgmt., Inc., No. 19-00739, 2019 WL
5681728, at *1 (Oct. 24, 2019) (Cutler, Arb.).
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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conclusion after just a single hearing session on the
expungement requests which lasted four hours or less. 209
Importantly, the arbitration systems seem unlikely to ever
definitively resolve this standard of proof issue or meaningfully
engage with arbitration decisions which do address the issue.
Arbitrations do not create any binding precedent and a
thoughtful resolution of the standard of proof issue by one
arbitrator will not bind another. 210 Parties to arbitrations do not
even need to inform the arbitration panel about arbitration
decisions interpreting the grounds because they are not legal
authority. 211 Although arbitration remains an “equitable”
forum, the arbitrators may only seek to do equity between the
named or appearing parties and not to the silent stakeholders
who do not appear in the proceeding. 212
5.

Limited Rights for Customers to Participate

FINRA Rules do not contain any provisions explicitly
providing for a right for customers to participate in
expungement hearings before information about their disputes
are erased from the public record. Instead, FINRA provides
guidance to arbitrators and instructs them to allow customers
to participate in expungement hearings. In guidance, FINRA
notifies arbitrators that it is “important to allow customers and
their counsel to participate in the expungement hearing in

209. Id. at *7. Within FINRA’s arbitration system, a “hearing session is
any meeting between the parties and arbitrator(s) of four hours or less.”
Summary of Arbitration Fees, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/7DA47EMY.
210. See Edwards, supra note 43, at 434 (pointing out that arbitration
“cannot ‘answer’ these questions in any meaningful way because their
decisions do not create precedent”).
211. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(requiring a lawyer to inform a tribunal about controlling legal authority).
212. Cf. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along:
The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1029–30
(2002) (“Arbitrators are expected to achieve an equitable resolution of the
dispute before them but they may not ignore the law. However, without ample
training or legal briefing by the parties on each relevant issue, how can the
arbitrators know what the law is or how to apply it?”).
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settled cases if they wish to.” 213 The guidance instructs
arbitrators that they should allow customers to appear with
counsel, testify, introduce documents and evidence,
cross-examine witnesses, and “present opening and closing
arguments if the panel allows any party to present such
arguments.” 214
FINRA issued the guidance after arbitrators in its forum
declined to allow a customer’s counsel to cross-examine a broker
who testified in favor of her own expungement request. 215 In this
case, the customer claimant had already settled in part because
the arbitration panel would not require the brokerage firm to
provide discovery or allow her to present any oral argument on
motions. 216 In this instance, the customer had clear notice
because the expungement hearing occurred within the
customer-initiated arbitration and the customer remained a
named party to the arbitration. 217 The broker, Kathleen J. Tarr,
gave an unsworn monologue that the allegations were “highly
offensive and without basis in any fact” and that she was “the
daughter and granddaughter of ministers.” 218 When counsel for
the customer sought to introduce the customer’s contrary
testimony and to question Tarr, the arbitration panel’s
chairperson stated that he did not “see that any testimony such
as this is necessary.” 219 When another arbitrator suggested
hearing the customer out to generate a complete record, the
chair responded “how can we make sure we're not going to be
here for another two hours? That’s the problem.” 220 Ultimately,
213. Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement
Guidance, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Sept. 2017), https://perma.cc/542Y-UNSN.
214. Id.
215. See Robert S. Banks, Jr., Muzzling the Claimant Due Process Denied
in FINRA Expungement Hearing, 21 PIABA B.J. 397, 397 (2014) (describing a
FINRA expungement hearing where a customer and counsel were not
permitted to fully participate).
216. Id. at 397 (describing a client who settled an action after an
arbitration panel chair “refused to allow oral argument on any of our motions
and refused to refer our motions to the full panel”).
217. Notably, brokers do not have to seek an expungement in the same
action. Many wait to name their employers in a subsequent action.
218. Banks, supra note 215, at 398.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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the three-arbitrator panel declined to allow the customer or
counsel to fully participate and unanimously recommended
expungement anyway. 221 Surprisingly, despite the protests of
the customer’s counsel, not one of the arbitrators dissented from
the decision. 222
With the assistance of pro bono counsel, the customer
sought to vacate the arbitration award. 223 In Royal Alliance
Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber, 224 the customer explained that she
had a real interest in the expungement proceeding “because the
award deemed her complaints against Tarr false and therefore
found her ‘essentially to have been a liar without anyone
hearing from her or giving her a right to cross-examine’” Tarr. 225
With FINRA also opposing confirmation, the award was
ultimately vacated because the arbitrators refused to hear
evidence from a party to the arbitration. 226
FINRA’s current guidance and training materials seem
designed to address the specific problems that arose in the Royal
Alliance arbitration. 227 It instructs arbitrators to permit
customers to do the specific things the customer was not allowed
to do in Royal Alliance, including appearing, presenting
testimony, and cross-examining any witnesses.

221. See Liebhaber v. Royal All. Assocs., No. 13-01522, 2014 WL 4647001,
at *2 (Sept. 10, 2014) (Stall, Jr., McLaughlin, & Aragon, Arbs.) (“Panel
recommends the expungement of all references to the above-captioned
arbitration from non-party Kathleen Tarr’s (CRD #4215307) registration
records maintained by the CRD.”).
222. As discussed below, arbitrators may decline to oppose expungement
requests because they fear they will not be selected for future panels if they
do. See supra Part II.C.1.e.
223. See Banks, supra note 215, at 400 (explaining that the customer “filed
an opposition to the confirmation petition and a request that the Award be
vacated, with generous assistance from . . . pro bono counsel”).
224. 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
225. Id. at 814.
226. Id. at 1110 (“[A]rbitrators gave Royal Alliance an unfettered
opportunity to bolster the written record but denied Liebhaber even a limited
chance to do the same.”).
227. See Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement
Guidance, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/PR8L-BDAN (last updated
Sept. 2017) (“It is important to allow customers and their counsel to
participate in the expungement hearing in settled cases if they wish to.”).
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The guidance fails to address the many instances where a
broker brings a separate expungement action to which the
customer is not a party. The guidance does not facilitate full
participation. Although FINRA’s guidance calls for arbitrators
to require brokers to provide notice and a copy of their
statement of claim when seeking an expungement, it does not
generally call for customers to have copies of everything that
has been submitted to the arbitrators. 228 As a result, customers
cannot see any answer that has been filed, participate in
arbitrator selection, readily view all other documents which
have been submitted, or even know what the arbitration panel
has been told about them in earlier hearings in the matter. This
puts the customers who do participate at a substantial
disadvantage in the matter.
Thus, even an unusually savvy customer who opted to
participate in expungement hearings where she was not a party
will struggle to oppose confirmation of any arbitration award.
Even after expending the time and effort necessary to oppose an
arbitration award, a customer will not receive notice of any
award when FINRA delivers it to the parties. 229 The customer
must search FINRA’s arbitration database to find out the
result. 230
The customer also receives no notice of the next
step—confirmation of the arbitration award in court. As the
customer was not a party to the arbitration, the customer will
not receive notice when a party seeks to confirm the arbitration
award. 231 This makes it practically impossible for customers to
block confirmation.

228. See EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 14 (“[N]otice provides
the customer(s) with the opportunity to advise the arbitrators and parties of
their position on the expungement request, which may assist arbitrators in
making the appropriate finding.”).
229. See Decision & Award, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc
/QEP4-LDAR (“Once the award is signed by a majority of the arbitrators,
FINRA will send copies of the award to each party or representative of the
party.”).
230. See id. (“FINRA makes all arbitration awards publicly available for
free by posting them on Arbitration Awards Online.”).
231. See id. (explaining the confirmation process).
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6.

No Independent Investigation in Arbitration

Facilitating expungements through arbitrations also
largely prevents any independent fact-finding into the
underlying disputes. FINRA’s training materials for arbitrators
instruct that arbitrators “should not make independent factual
investigations of a case.” 232 Although FINRA encourages
arbitrators to ask questions of the parties and for the parties to
provide any briefing requested by the arbitrator, its guidance
makes clear that arbitrators “generally should review only those
materials presented by the parties.” 233
A rule against any independent investigation makes the
most sense when purely private parties with equal resources
have contracted for an arbitrator to decide a dispute. It makes
less sense when it puts public information at risk and forces
arbitrators to refrain from conducting even the most
rudimentary of independent investigations.
D.

Past Problems

The incentives and processes detailed above have left
FINRA
continually
struggling
to
manage
the
arbitration-facilitated expungement process. As explained
below, FINRA has moved to address some past problems, yet
resolving these concerns has not substantially improved the
process.
1.

Stipulated Expungements after Settlements

For years, brokers secured expungements through
stipulated awards agreed to as part of a settlement process. 234
In explaining the operation of NASD Rule 2130, an earlier
232. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES
ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE 60 (2020), https://perma.cc/9DR9-49CC (PDF).
233. Id.
234. See Christine Lazaro, Has Expungement Broken Brokercheck?, 14 J.
BUS. & SEC. L. 125, 136 (2014) (“[P]arties would place a stipulated award
before the arbitrators containing an expungement directive, which the
arbitrators would then sign. The broker would then confirm the award in a
court of competent jurisdiction either with the consent of the customer or by
default if the customer did not appear.”).
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version of FINRA Rule 2080, FINRA explained how brokers
could procure a stipulated award containing the findings
necessary to have information about the dispute expunged from
public records. 235 The process was straightforward. Settling
parties simply asked the arbitration panel “for a stipulated
award and request[ed] that the panel make affirmative findings
and order expungement based on one or more of the standards
in Rule 2130.” 236 After Rule 2130 came into effect, FINRA noted
that arbitrators would still state in the award the basis on which
the expungement relief was granted.” 237
Stipulated awards sat in tension with the rule’s
requirement that an expungement recommendation be “based
on affirmative judicial or arbitral findings.” 238 FINRA’s
guidance on stipulated expungement awards did not direct
arbitrators to make any searching inquiry to protect the public’s
interest in the accuracy and reliability of CRD information.
After all, an arbitrator ordinarily sits to resolve a private
dispute, not to play some public enforcement role. One scholar
explained that the “message in the Notice is that the arbitrators’
role is to execute the request for expungement rather than
conduct an independent, skeptical review.” 239 Notably, the SEC
never directly addressed stipulated awards in its order
approving NASD Rule 2130. 240
But concerns about stipulated awards and the risk that
brokers would force customers to agree to expungement as a
settlement condition had been raised. One prescient commenter
235. Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 04-16 Expungement of
Customer Dispute Information from the CRD 214 (March 2004), https://
perma.cc/E7HJ-5NHW (PDF). FINRA was known as the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) until 2007, when it became FINRA.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Lipner, supra note 91, at 76.
240. See Order Granting Approval and Notice of Filing and Order
Granting Accelerated Approval Relating to Proposed NASD Rule 2130
Concerning the Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the
Central Registration Depository System No. 34–48933, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,667,
74,667 (Dec. 24, 2003) (discussing requirements for obtaining an order of
expungement of customer dispute information from the central registration
depository).
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argued that a “broker should not be allowed to purchase a clean
CRD from a destitute customer. This is especially true when the
broker is the reason the customer is destitute.” 241 The
commenter also panned judicial confirmation as a “phony
safeguard” because customers were not likely to appear at
confirmation hearings and they would be granted “without
independent review unless the NASD objects.” 242
Over time, stipulated awards facilitating the expungement
of information likely did real harm to the public by enabling
fraud and misconduct to go undetected. Consider the aftermath
of one stipulated expungement. Carl Martellaro served as a
principal for First Associated Securities Group, a firm FINRA
expelled from the securities industry in the year 2000. 243 Years
before FINRA discovered wrongdoing and expelled the firm, two
investors alleged that Martellaro had run a fraudulent scheme
causing them to lose $1.75 million. 244 Martellaro settled the
dispute on the condition that the investors would not oppose his
subsequent request to expunge information about their
complaint from public records. 245 He succeeded and later went
on to run a Ponzi scheme causing other investors to suffer $125
million in losses. 246 The attorney who represented the first two
investors explained that although his clients “cut a deal, . . . the
public got cut out.” 247
These deals left only a faint trace behind. A search of
arbitration awards reveals that Martellaro successfully
expunged at least two disputes from his record before his Ponzi
scheme ultimately collapsed. In 1999, an arbitration award
directed that a dispute alleging $1.25 million in damages be
241. Letter from Barry D. Estell to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 28, 2003)
(arguing that an “agreement to expunge an arbitration claim is inherently
corrupt and contrary to the purpose of the CRD”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
242. Id.
243. First Associated Securities Group, Inc., BROKERCHECK, https://
perma.cc/5KYC-Y6F6.
244. Michael Freedman, The X-ed Out Files, FORBES (Dec. 25, 2000, 12:00
AM), https://perma.cc/23HN-9D3F.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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expunged. 248 In the same year, arbitrators also directed that
another claim alleging $500,000 in damages be expunged. 249 On
both occasions, the parties secured a stipulated award calling
for the information to be expunged. 250
In Martellaro’s case, the expungement of dispute
information likely facilitated his ongoing fraud. Investors doing
ordinary diligence would not see complaint information on his
record. Regulators surveying the CRD records for red flags
involving brokers operating within their territory would also not
have seen the information.
State regulators eventually intervened to oppose the
confirmation of some stipulated awards with mixed success. 251
In 2007, Maryland sought to block the confirmation of a
stipulated expungement award, arguing that the Maryland
Securities Commissioner “has a substantial interest in ensuring
the integrity of her records.” 252 The customer had collected a
$47,000 settlement on the condition that she stipulate to the
expungement of all reference to the dispute. 253 After the district
court initially rejected Maryland’s request to intervene, the D.C.
Circuit found that the state regulator should be allowed to
intervene as of right because Maryland had an interest in
protecting its records and neither the broker nor the customer

248. Drake v. First Associated Sec. Grp., No. 95-03869, 1999 WL 1253565,
at *2 (Jan. 15, 1999) (Bardack, Krotinger, & Mainardi, Arbs.).
249. See Bann v. First Associated Sec. Grp., No. 96-04601, 1999 WL
1253604, at *3 (Jan. 15, 1999) (Gault, Goldberg, & McClaskey, Arbs.) (“The
NASD shall expunge from its Central Registration Depository (CRD) records
maintained for stipulating Respondents Carl Martellaro, Larry Miller, Jay
Dugan and First Securities USA, all references to this claim.”).
250. In 2014, FINRA prohibited member firms from conditioning any
settlement offer on a customer agreeing not to oppose the expungement of
complaint information. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Notice to Members 14-31
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information 4 (July 2014), https://
perma.cc/3R5A-B2N9 (PDF).
251. See Lazaro, supra note 234, at 139–46 (describing state efforts to
intervene to stop courts from confirming awards recommending
expungement).
252. Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
253. Id. at 881.
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“represents the Commissioner's interest in protecting the
integrity of the CRD.” 254
States still struggled to block the confirmation of stipulated
awards. Some courts confirmed expungement awards over state
opposition. 255 For example, New York unsuccessfully sought to
intervene and oppose an expungement arising out of a
stipulated award in Kay v. Abrams. 256 There, the broker had
paid $155,000 to secure a stipulated award providing “for
confidentiality and expungement of the matter from CRD
records.” 257 The court confirmed the award because it felt bound
by precedent that it lacked authority to set aside the award
because a New York appellate court had reversed a prior trial
court for refusing to confirm an expungement. 258 Generally,
New York’s attempts to intervene were unsuccessful because
the New York courts generally “viewed their role in the
expungement controversy as highly limited, rejecting the policy
arguments made by the Attorney General.” 259
Still, the efforts brought attention to significant concerns
with how arbitration rules facilitated expungement. One court
highlighted real issues with the stipulated award process by
focusing on the award before her. 260 The court explained that
254. Id. at 885–86.
255. See, e.g., Walker v. Connelly, 21 Misc. 3d 1123(A), at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 16, 2008) (“The Attorney General opposes confirmation of the stipulated
award pursuant to CPLR 7511(b) on the grounds that the panel ‘exceeded its
authority.’”).
256. See Kay v. Abrams, 853 N.Y.S.2d 862, 867 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (“[S]ince no
basis has been alleged to deny confirmation, other than the legal arguments
of the Attorney General referred to above, petitioner’s motion to confirm the
Award is granted. In light of the foregoing, the application of the Attorney
General to intervene is denied.”).
257. Id. at 863.
258. Id. at 866–67 (citing Goldstein v. Preisler, 805 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App.
Div. 2005)) (“Although the then Attorney General did not seek to intervene in
that case, since it is on ‘all fours’ with the case at bar and there is no contrary
First Department decision, the court feels bound by the determination
therein.”).
259. Lipner, supra note 91, at 80.
260. See In re Sage, Rutty, & Co. v. Salzberg, No. 2007-01942, slip op. at
4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2007) (order granting partial rehearing) (“A hearing
was never conducted, no written settlement agreement was ever drafted, and
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“there are aspects of the [s]tipulated [a]ward which trouble the
[c]ourt. The arbitrators found that (certain) claims were
factually impossible or clearly erroneous, but there is not a
single fact or circumstance described upon which the arbitrators
base this conclusion.” 261
Concerns about an arbitration-facilitated expungement
process grew. One review of 200 stipulated or settled arbitration
awards in 2006 found arbitrators regularly granted
expungement without conducting any affirmative fact
finding. 262 On the whole, arbitrators granted expungement
requests after settlements 98 percent of the time. 263 The
arbitrators conducted no fact-based hearings 71 percent of the
time. 264 The troubling statistics revealed that decisions to
expunge information from public records were being made
without fully informed arbitrators. As one law professor noted,
arbitrators were not considering “the larger policy implications
and considerations associated with an effective CRD system.” 265
In many cases, arbitrators were simply ordering “expungement
at the request of a party to facilitate settlement of a dispute.” 266
After some negative publicity, FINRA moved in 2008 to
make changes to its code. It added Rules 12805 and 13805 to
require arbitrators to hold at least one hearing session and

no other documents were submitted. In that sense, the arbitrators’ decision on
expungement is irrational because it was made without any evidentiary
support.”).
261. Id. at 4.
262. See PUB. INV’RS ARB. BAR ASS’N, STUDY OF STIPULATED OR SETTLED
NASD CUSTOMER AWARDS, ISSUED IN CALENDAR YEAR 2006, FOR WHICH
STATEMENTS OF CLAIM WERE FILED ON, OR SUBSEQUENT TO, APRIL 12, 2004, 14
(2007), https://perma.cc/A7A3-NZNN (PDF) (reviewing these awards).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Letter from Barbara Black, Charles Hartsock Professor of Law, Dir.
of Corp. Law Ctr., Univ. of Cincinnati, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 2 (Apr. 24, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
266. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of
Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,086, 66,087
(Nov. 6, 2008).
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explain the basis for their expungement recommendations. 267
These new rules effectively ended stipulated awards but left the
underlying incentives unchanged.
2.

Purchasing Perjury & Silence

Brokers had also found other ways to ensure that
arbitration panels would approve requests for expungements.
Brokers ensured one-sided expungement hearings and evidence
by conditioning settlement offers on a customer either agreeing
to support an expungement with a sworn affidavit saying the
underlying complaint was false, or at least an agreement not to
oppose a broker’s request. 268 FINRA took repeated steps to
address the issue. In 2004, FINRA warned industry members
that “affidavits, attested to in connection with settlements that
often are incorporated into stipulated awards, appear to be
inconsistent on their face with the initial claim and terms of the
settlement.” 269 FINRA explained that members may face
discipline if they submitted “affidavits in which the content is
the product of a bargained-for consideration as opposed to the
truth.” 270 Obtaining expungements with bargained-for evidence
undercuts the requirement that arbitrators have some

267. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to
Amendments to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure to Establish New
Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When Considering Requests for
Expungement Relief, Fed. Reg. 18,308, 18,308 (Apr. 3, 2008) (“The procedures
are designed to: (1) make sure that arbitrators have the opportunity to
consider the facts that support or weigh against a decision to grant
expungement; and (2) ensure that expungement occurs only when the
arbitrators find and document one of the narrow grounds specified in Rule
2130.”).
268. See Melanie S. Cherdack, Drafting A Securities Arbitration Claim:
The Pen Is (Still) Mightier Than the Market, 18 PIABA B.J. 333, 342 (2011)
(explaining that for claimant’s counsel “[n]aming the individual broker may
have benefits, too . . . . If, for instance, the broker is a big producer and
important to the firm, the firm may have some incentive to settle the action
and seek your client’s cooperation . . . .”).
269. See Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 04-43 Members’ Use
of Affidavits in Connection with Stipulated Awards and Settlements to Obtain
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information 554 (June 2004), https://
perma.cc/2H7C-F7M6 (PDF) (warning against procuring false affidavits).
270. Id.
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affirmative basis for recommending an expungement. 271 In
effect, the practice of requiring customers to swear to affidavits
attesting that their initial claim was “false” may have amounted
to purchasing perjury.
Despite the warning, brokers continued to negotiate for
customers to assist with, or at least not oppose, their
expungement requests as a settlement condition until 2014
when FINRA updated its rules to prohibit the practice. 272 In
adopting the rule, FINRA explained that it believed the new
rule would “ensure that information is expunged from the CRD
system only when there is an independent judicial or arbitral
decision that expungement is appropriate” 273
As often happens, new problems arise after regulators
address old ones. 274 The NASD prohibited the use of affidavits
in 2004, ended stipulated awards in 2008, and explicitly
prohibited negotiations over nonparticipation in expungements
in 2014. 275 In response to these changes, many brokers began to
seek expungements in separate arbitrations naming their
current or former employers as respondents. A report from the
PIABA Foundation found that there has been an “explosive

271. See Scott Ilgenfritz, Expungement Study of the Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Association, 20 PIABA B.J. 339, 349 (2013) (“Bargaining for
such an affidavit from a customer claimant could clearly result in the ‘buying
of a clean record’ and would make a mockery of any ‘affirmative determination’
of one of the three grounds in Rule 2130 by a panel of arbitrators.”).
272. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2081 (2014) (prohibiting brokers
and firms from conditioning “settlement of a dispute with a customer on, or to
otherwise compensate the customer for, the customer’s agreement to consent
to, or not to oppose, the member’s or associated person’s request to expunge
such customer dispute information from the CRD system”).
273. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 14–31 Expungement of Customer
Dispute Information 2 (July 2014), https://perma.cc/Q4MN-2S2Q (PDF).
274. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S351 (2014) (explaining that in
the “financial sector, however, the system that generates costs and benefits is
constructed by financial regulation itself and the subsequent processes of
adaptation and regulatory arbitrage. An important new rule will change the
system beyond our calculative powers”).
275. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2081 (2014) (“Rule 2081 removes
the ability of parties to a customer arbitration to bargain for expungement
relief as part of a settlement negotiation.”).
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increase” in these “expungement-only” arbitrations, rising 924
percent from 2015 to 2018. 276
E.

Uninformed Decisions

Ultimately, the current system for arbitration-facilitated
expungements reveals that arbitrations now regularly occur
where no party has any real incentive to bring pertinent,
material information to the attention of arbitrators if that
information would diminish the odds that an arbitrator will
grant an expungement request. Courts asked to confirm these
arbitration awards should not have any confidence that the
arbitrators made a well-informed decision. Although the
arbitrators may hear all the evidence presented to them, they
usually hear no more than what the broker seeking an
expungement wants them to hear.
Consider an arbitration award directing expungement
obtained by Patrick James Dwyer, a broker who once managed
billions of dollars in assets. 277 Dwyer secured an arbitration
award recommending the expungement of six different
customer complaints in two hearing sessions conducted on the
same day. 278 His employer, Merrill Lynch, did not oppose the
expungement request and indicated that it “agreed that a
finding should be entered by the Panel in favor of” the
expungement request. 279 Of the six complaining customers, only
three of them received any form of notice. 280 Dwyer’s counsel
took the position “that the notification requirements of an
expungement request applies to customers who have filed for
276. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 3.
277. See Braswell & Horowitz, supra note 147 (reporting that Dwyer “led
a 12-person team that managed some $3.7 billion and generated over $10
million of annual revenue, left this week while under review”).
278. See In re Dwyer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No.
16-02781, 2017 WL 3189311, at *6 (July 20, 2017) (Ainbinder, Arb.) (noting
that Plaintiff’s requested relief was the expungement of all records of these
occurrences).
279. Id. at *1.
280. See id. (“Claimant provided notice of this proceeding to the only
customer who filed for arbitration . . . . Claimant also provided notice to two
other customers and they or their counsel gave written authority to not oppose
nor support Claimant’s request for expungement . . . .”).
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arbitration.” 281 Because some of the complaining customers had
never filed an arbitration complaint against Dwyer, he did not
notify them of the expungement hearing at all. 282 Hearing no
objections from customers, some of whom had not even been told
about the hearing, the arbitration panel agreed. 283 The panel
noted as significant the fact that his employer supported the
request. 284 The panel trusted Merrill Lynch to faithfully defend
the integrity of the CRD because Merrill Lynch, as Dwyer’s
employer, also had “a duty to protect the investing public and
the firm’s customers from improper, fraudulent or otherwise
culpable conduct.” 285
But the arbitration panel did not hear the complete story.
FINRA sought to vacate the award in a Florida state court,
contending that Dwyer had fraudulently concealed information
from the arbitration panel and exhibited an “extreme lack of
candor” in the arbitration proceeding. 286 Dwyer, a Miami-based
broker, had previously filed an action against FINRA in a
California court seeking to force FINRA to expunge information
from the CRD. 287 Although his name eventually emerged as the
broker behind the request, Dwyer had filed his California suit
under a pseudonym. He may have sought relief in court first
under the pseudonym to avoid the publicity that would follow

281. See id. (“Claimant’s counsel advised the Panel that it was his position
that the notification requirements of an expungement request applies to
customers who have filed for arbitration. The Panel agrees with Claimant’s
counsel’s position.”).
282. See id. (noting that despite the fact that only one customer had filed
an arbitration, Dwyer’s counsel represented that he had secured some written
statement of some kind from two other complaining customers that they would
not oppose the expungement request).
283. See id. at *2 (recommending expungement).
284. See id. (“Critical facts regarding the Focus 20 Fund were not
contradicted by Respondent’s representative.”).
285. Id.
286. Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award at ¶¶ 9–10, Fin. Indus. Reg.
Auth., Inc. v. Dwyer, No. 2017-023398-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2017), Dkt. No. 3.
287. See id. at Exhibit B (filing under the pseudonym John Doe).
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when a broker with his multibillion-dollar book of business won
an expungement. 288
Yet once Dwyer named FINRA as a defendant in a court
action, FINRA contested the case and won, securing a post-trial
decision denying Dwyer’s request to have information expunged
from the CRD database. 289 After adversarial litigation, the
California court found that Dwyer “presented no evidence to
show that any of these complaints are false, inaccurate,
meritless or frivolous” and that the “disclosure of accurate
customer dispute information is most definitely in the public
interest.” 290 The California court concluded that the “equities
weigh heavily against expungement of Plaintiff Dwyer’s
record.” 291 The California court was presented with evidence
and information that Dwyer, Dwyer’s counsel, and Merrill
Lynch declined to provide to the arbitration panel.
Ultimately, the Florida court considering vacating the
arbitration award recommending expungement never ruled on
the propriety of Dwyer’s behavior. On November 15, 2018, the
parties presented the court with a joint stipulation of
dismissal. 292 It stipulated that Dwyer’s Petition to Confirm the
Arbitration Award was “dismissed with prejudice.” 293 Thus,
FINRA succeeded at keeping the customer dispute information
on the CRD system.
Dwyer may have failed in his expungement attempt
because he went to court first and faced FINRA as an actual
adversary. If he had proceeded through arbitration first against
his employer, FINRA likely would not have sought to block the
confirmation of Dwyer’s award—or had a clear ground to do so.
288. See, e.g., Star Merrill PBIG Broker Sweeps His Record Nearly Clean,
ADVISORHUB (July 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/HN22-L722 (reporting on
Dwyer’s expungement award).
289. See Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award, supra note 286, at 28, Ex.
B (“This is not a close case. The equities weigh heavily against expungement
of Plaintiff Dwyer’s record.”).
290. Id. at 27–28.
291. Id. at 28.
292. See Stipulation to Dismissal with Prejudice, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth.,
Inc. v. Dwyer, No. 2017-023398-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2017), Dkt. No. 56
(stipulating to a dismissal with prejudice of Dwyer’s petition to confirm the
arbitration award).
293. Id.
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Under Rule 2080, FINRA must be named as a defendant in
court actions unless FINRA waives the requirements under
Rule 2080. 294 If Dwyer had obtained affirmative arbitral
findings first, FINRA might have waived the requirement to
name it as a party or chosen not to contest the expungement
because no strong rationale for opposing the individual
arbitration award seems readily apparent. The process
effectively leaves it up to the parties and the rare customer to
present arbitrators with pertinent, material facts.
III. Interventions
Some interventions may address, or at least mitigate
adversarial failure. The best solution, discussed in the next
subpart, would be to simply remove expungement and other
matters with a high degree of adversarial failure from
adversarial systems entirely. Absent that, process-oriented
changes and ethics-focused interventions might address the
issue to some degree.
Ultimately, adversarial failure occurs whenever the parties
to an action have no real incentive to present information to an
adjudicator. In these situations, courts, regulators, and
legislators should not assume that an adjudicator made an
informed decision because no party had any real incentive to
present the adjudicator with complete information. Adversarial
failure may often be a matter of degree. In some instances, a
disparity of resources or advocate skill and diligence may
generate the same results.
A.

Moving Away from Adversarial Adjudication

In most instances, it may be better to simply abandon
adversarial adjudication in favor of some alternative approach.
Barbara Black suggested this type of shift in 2008, explaining
that “the integrity of the CRD is such an important and integral
part of an effective investor education and protection system
that only the regulators whose responsibilities include, first and
294. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2080 (2009) (“Members or
associated persons petitioning a court for expungement relief . . . must name
FINRA as an additional party . . . unless this requirement is waived.”).
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foremost, protection of the investing public should make
decisions about removing information from the record.” 295 Black
also recognized that arbitration may be particularly ill-suited to
this task because the “arbitrators’ mission . . . does not include
consideration of the larger policy implications and
considerations associated with an effective CRD system.” 296
For expungement processes, the interests of all
stakeholders may be better balanced by removing the entire
process from an adversarial system. When the parties to an
action do not have real incentives to fully inform an adjudicator,
society should not resolve issues by routing them through a
phony adversarial process and then roping courts in to confirm
the results.
Gaming regulation may provide a rough, workable model
for effectively policing the CRD system’s integrity. Consider how
Nevada approaches gaming licenses. Lawyers and enrolled
agents who practice before the Nevada gaming regulators
operate within a demanding regulatory framework. When a
lawyer appears on a client’s behalf before the Nevada Gaming
and Control Board, “the person represented [is] deemed to have
waived all privileges with respect to any information in the
possession of such attorney.” 297 The gaming regulators also
require attorneys practicing before them to be expansively
candid, explaining that they “shall not be intentionally
untruthful to the board or commission, nor withhold from the
board or commission any information which the board or
commission is entitled to receive.” 298 These obligations also
include a duty to investigate before appearing and instruct that
attorneys appearing before gaming regulators “shall exercise
due diligence in preparing or assisting in the preparation of
documents for submission to the board or commission.” 299 The
regulations place continuing obligations on attorneys appearing

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Black, supra note 265, at 2.
Id.
NEV. GAMING REG. § 10.080 (2017).
Id. § 10.090(1).
Id. § 10.090(2).
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before the board to update any information that is “no longer
accurate and complete in any material respect.” 300
Gaming regulators make the lawyers appearing before
them function as gatekeepers. 301 A lawyer may be banned from
practicing before the gaming regulators if she “willfully failed to
exercise diligence in the preparation or presentation” materials
or “knowingly misrepresented any material fact to the board or
commission.” 302 In effect, an attorney may lose her right to
practice before the regulator if she fails to discover readily
available information. Bad faith behavior or simple ineptitude
may also result in exclusion. 303
But the attorneys do not serve as the only gatekeepers.
Importantly, gaming regulators do not rely entirely upon these
expansive disclosure requirements or expect attorneys and
applicants to surface all information on their own. They
independently investigate persons who apply for a gaming
license and may even bill applicants for the costs incurred in
conducting an investigation. 304
An appropriate gatekeeper model may greatly improve the
process. Securities regulators already have substantial
familiarity with gatekeeping. 305 The securities laws impose
gatekeeping liability on underwriters in an effort to improve the
quality of information investors receive. 306 Underwriters put
300. Id. § 10.090(3).
301. Professor Coffee defines “gatekeeper” as “a reputational intermediary
who provides verification or certification services to investors.” John C. Coffee,
Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004).
302. NEV. GAMING REG. § 10.065(2)(b) (2017).
303. Id. § 10.025(2)(d) (allowing exclusion if a person lacks “requisite
qualifications or expertise to represent others before the board or commission,
lacks character or integrity, or has engaged in unethical or improper conduct”).
304. See id. § 4.070 (“[T]he Board may require an applicant to pay such
supplementary investigative fees and costs as may be determined by the
Board.”).
305. See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to
Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 367 (2004) (“Professor Coffee and I both
support a strict liability regime for gatekeepers, not a negligence regime.”).
306. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (2003) (“The underwriter in an initial
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their capital and reputations on the line when selling securities.
In contrast, arbitrators are not well-situated to serve as key
gatekeepers here. They face no liability for any failure, and they
lack real incentives and tools to gather information necessary to
make an informed decision. If anything, a reputation for close
scrutiny may reduce the likelihood that an arbitrator will even
be selected. Fundamentally, arbitrators should not serve as the
key gatekeepers in this context.
A regulatory model for resolving these types of disputes
would likely yield better informed decisions. As an independent,
self-regulatory organization, FINRA could transition its
involvement in the expungement process from passively
operating an arbitration forum to a more significant
gatekeeping role. Some regulatory process akin to the method
Nevada uses to vet applicants for gaming licenses might serve
as a rough model for a process through which FINRA could
better balance the key interests at stake here, allowing brokers
to contest and remove provably false information while
protecting the integrity of information within the CRD.
A well-constituted committee could manage this process. A
committee could incorporate relevant stakeholders including
state securities regulators, investor advocates, and brokerage
firms. Channeling all expungement requests through a single
committee instead of a rotating cast of arbitrators would allow
for a more regularized process to develop. Importantly, the
committee would accumulate experience resolving these issues
much more rapidly than a broadly dispersed pool of arbitrators.
A committee could also hire counsel, investigators, and others
to help surface information relevant to the committee’s decision.
This would allow the committee to avoid total dependence on a
requesting party’s willingness to provide information.
B.

Changes to Attorney Ethics Rules

Professional ethics rules shape how attorneys present
information to adjudicators when advocating for their clients. In
most states, the ethical rules governing law practice generally
public offering also performs a gatekeeping function, in the sense that its
reputation is implicitly pledged and it is expected to perform due diligence
services.”).
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track the ethics rules and policies promulgated by the American
Bar Association (ABA). 307 As the lawyers elected to the ABA
House of Delegates have obligations to their own clients, the
lawyers collaborating to generate these rules “likely have direct
financial interest in the rules that they draft.” 308
Our adversarial system of justice implicitly assumes
tribunals will reach informed decisions because each side will
investigate the matter and bring forward facts relevant to the
dispute. 309 In theory, clashing parties will hold each other
accountable and point out any errors, allowing adjudicators to
reach informed decisions. 310 This idyllic vision does not match
reality. 311 As explained below, the current ethics rules grant
lawyers broad flexibility to frame factual scenarios in their
clients’ interest without cluing courts or arbitrators in to all
relevant information.
1.

Existing Rules Treat Law and Fact Differently

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct treat legal
arguments and factual presentations differently, often allowing
lawyers to withhold adverse relevant facts from a tribunal as
long as they disclose governing law. 312 ABA Model Rule 3.3,
which speaks to a lawyer’s duty of candor, treats a failure to
307. See Renee Newman Knake, The Legal Monopoly, 93 WASH. L. REV.
1293, 1298 (2018) (“Most states draw from model ethics rules and policies
promulgated by lawyers elected by their peers to the American Bar
Association (‘ABA’) House of Delegates.”).
308. Id.
309. I use the word “tribunal” here to track the ethics rules and because it
also encompasses disputes resolved by an arbitrator.
310. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE ¶ 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2020) (“When an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous
advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being
done.”).
311. See Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of
Adjudication, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2006) (explaining that the
general assumption that the adversarial system will on balance generate the
best results has “been shown to be not just mistaken but simply implausible.
To begin with, its factual predicates do not generally obtain.”).
312. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 cmt.
c. (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) (pointing out that that “it is sometimes argued that
the rule . . . it draws a dubious distinction between legal authority and facts”).
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disclose pertinent, adverse legal authority differently from a
failure to disclose pertinent, adverse facts. 313
a.

Governing Law

ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) prohibits lawyers from knowingly
failing to disclose “legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.” 314 The official
comment to the rule explains that “[t]he underlying concept is
that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the
legal premises properly applicable to the case.” 315 In essence, the
ethics rule sometimes requires a lawyer to carry the discussion
into legal territory she might prefer to avoid—even if the lawyer
on the other side of the case does not raise the precedent. 316
The expectation that lawyers will not knowingly withhold
information about relevant past precedents has long been part
of the American legal system. 317 Alabama included
requirements to not knowingly cite “as authority an overruled
case” or not “knowingly misquoting the language of a decision”
in the Alabama Code of Ethics of 1887. 318 The Restatement also
embraces this view and makes clear that a lawyer “may not
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly

313. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (2020) (distinguishing
between the two).
314. Id. at (a)(2).
315. Id. at cmt. 4.
316. See Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op.
146 (1935) (explaining that a precedent-disclosing lawyer “may, of course,
after doing so, challenge the soundness of the decisions or present reasons
which he believes would warrant the court in not following them in the
pending case”).
317. See Andrea Pin & Francesca M. Genova, The Duty to Disclose Adverse
Precedents: The Spirit of the Common Law and Its Enemies, 44 YALE J. INT’L
L. 239, 256 (2019) (tracing the origin on the rule).
318. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N r. 5 (1887), reprinted in
ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N 336 (1918).
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adverse to the position asserted by the client and not disclosed
by opposing counsel.” 319
Courts have reacted harshly to lawyers who fail to present
relevant, adverse legal authority when arguing for their clients.
Most famously, Judge Posner published an opinion directing a
stinging rebuke at one lawyer for failing to cite relevant
authority. 320 After the lawyer repeatedly failed to address a
particular case, the opinion compared the lawyer to an ostrich,
explaining that the “ostrich is a noble animal, but not a proper
model for an appellate advocate.” 321 Capturing additional
attention, the opinion includes two photographs, one with an
ostrich burying its head in the sand and another with a figure
clad in a tan business suit in a similar posture. 322
b.

Factual Presentations

In contrast, the Model Rules and ethical norms do not
usually require lawyers to disclose adverse factual information.
Instead, the model rule instructs that a lawyer “shall not
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to the
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.” 323 The
Restatement also follows this approach and prohibits lawyers
from offering testimony the lawyers knows to be false. 324

319. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111(2) (AM.
LAW. INST. 2000).
320. See Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir.
2011) (“When there is apparently dispositive precedent, an appellant may urge
its overruling or distinguishing or reserve a challenge to it for a petition for
certiorari but may not simply ignore it.”).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 935. Notably, the rebuke itself may have been an ethical breach
for Judge Posner. See Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Benchslaps, 2017 UTAH L. REV.
331, 352 (2017) (criticizing so-called benchslaps because “[i]nstead of meeting
the attorney’s unprofessional or unethical conduct with dispassionate and
professional counseling or sanctions, the judges in these benchslaps . . . use[d]
their authority to shame and belittle the lawyers”).
323. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
324. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM.
LAW. INST. 2000) (prohibiting lawyers from offering false facts or testimony to
the tribunal).
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The Knowledge Qualifier

A lawyer’s ethical obligations within this framework shift
once the lawyer has knowledge that some evidence or factual
information is false. The knowledge qualifier grants substantial
flexibility and even allows lawyers to present information they
believe to be false. The Model Rules define “knowledge” as
“actual knowledge of the fact in question,” with the addition that
“[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.” 325
In discussing the ABA’s Model Rule, the official comment
explains that the “prohibition against offering false evidence
only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. Even
a lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not
preclude its presentation to the trier of fact.” 326
Substantial justification undergirds this rule. Lawyers
practice with limited information and may not be able to
actually know whether a client’s account actually transpired or
was simply fabricated. If lawyers could not present a client’s
version of events simply because the lawyer harbored some
doubts, it would substantially interfere with a client’s ability to
obtain assistance.
Doubting lawyers do not always need to investigate dubious
factual claims. A comment to the Model Rule instructs lawyers
to “resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other
evidence in favor of the client.” 327 The ethics rules do not
explicitly require lawyers to make any attempt to put their
doubts to rest before offering evidence they believe may be
false. 328 Although the comment to the Model Rule indicates that
a lawyer may not “ignore an obvious falsehood,” in most practice
situations, lawyers have no clear ethical obligation to
investigate their client’s factual claims or search for evidence
which would show that a client has given a false factual

325. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1(f) (2020).
326. Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2020).
327. Id.
328. See George M. Cohen, The State of Lawyer Knowledge Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 117 (2014)
(“The actual knowledge standard aims to exclude a duty to inquire.”).

1118

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2020)

account. 329 George Cohen characterized the “knowledge”
qualifier as a “key marker in a contentious struggle over the
scope of a lawyer’s duty to investigate.” 330 The ethics rules only
create clear liability for lawyers issuing reckless statements
about “the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory
officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office.” 331
In some instances, lawyers may decide that they would
rather not investigate and know the truth because knowing the
truth might impair their ability to advocate for a client. 332
George Cohen explains that “a lawyer faced with a suspicious
fact” might reason that “investigating would be a bad idea
because that would put the lawyer at risk of violating the
knowledge-based rule.” 333 Of course, for lawyers practicing in
federal court, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide
a limited check. FRCP Rule 11 forces lawyers submitting papers
to a court to certify that a lawyer conducted “an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances.” 334 The requirement does
not force a lawyer to certify that she believes a contention to be
true, so much as “the factual contentions have evidentiary
support.” 335 In some instances, this evidentiary support may
simply be a client’s doubtful claims.

329. See id. at 125 (“Thus, a lawyer faced with a suspicious fact that is not
sufficient along with other circumstances to impart actual knowledge need not
do anything further.”).
330. Id. at 124.
331. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (2020).
332. Duties of inquiry do exist in some practice areas. In transactional
securities practice, lawyers and other professionals have long faced a duty to
inquire. See Cohen, supra note 328, at 118 (“Transactional lawyers in
particular are familiar with the recklessness standard because it plays an
important role in securities fraud and other business crimes and torts.”).
Lawyers must also make inquiries when preparing opinion letters. See, e.g.,
Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(“Necessarily implicit in any [opinion letter] contract is the lawyer’s duty to
investigate the title with reasonable diligence and to report his findings
accurately.”).
333. Cohen, supra note 328, at 125.
334. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
335. Id. (b)(3).
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A Limited Duty to Correct

Under the ethics rules, lawyers owe only a limited
obligation to inform a tribunal when they know that false
evidence has been presented to it. The ABA’s Model Rules only
explicitly require lawyers to take “remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal” when a
lawyer learns that she, her client, or a witness she called offered
material evidence she later came to know was false. 336 The
Restatement takes the view that lawyers have “no responsibility
to correct false testimony or other evidence offered by an
opposing party or witness.” 337
Lawyers do owe an obligation to the tribunal to correct false
information when they have had some hand in presenting the
information to the tribunal. The Restatement explains that even
if it would hurt a client’s interests, a lawyer must correct false
information she had some role in presenting because
“preservation of the integrity of the forum is a superior
interest.” 338
e.

Undisclosed Vital Factual Evidence

In most situations, ethics rules do not obligate lawyers to
provide tribunals or opposing counsel with all, significant,
material information in their possession. 339 The ethics rules do
not generally require lawyers to volunteer accurate information
vital to developing an informed understanding of a dispute. 340
336. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
337. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. d.
(2000) (“[A] plaintiff’s lawyer, aware that an adverse witness being examined
by the defendant’s lawyer is giving false evidence favorable to the plaintiff, is
not required to correct it . . . .”).
338. Id. cmt. b.
339. See Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an
Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 715 (1997) (“It is a
well-established doctrine that lawyers have no obligation to disclose
voluntarily . . . to opposing parties or to the tribunal evidence that is material
to the case, even if nondisclosure would produce a result that is inconsistent
with the truth.”).
340. See John A. Humbach, Shifting Paradigms of Lawyer Honesty, 76
TENN. L. REV. 993, 1013 (2009) (“[I]t is a professional truism of current
American legal practice that a lawyer has no general duty to volunteer.”).
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The ABA has even issued a formal ethics opinion that lawyers
may violate the ethics rules if they inform opposing counsel that
the statute of limitations has run on a claim because it would
violate their duties to their client. 341 At the most, the comment
to the ABA ethics rule recognizes that some circumstances exist
“where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an
affirmative misrepresentation.” 342
Some courts have found “failure to make disclosure of a
material fact to a tribunal is the equivalent of affirmative
misrepresentation.” 343 New Jersey goes further than most
states and requires lawyers to disclose unprivileged or
otherwise unprotected material facts if a court would otherwise
be misled by nondisclosure. 344 These limited requirements leave
substantial room for error.
Yet tribunals often fail to receive information vital to
developing a well-informed understanding of a dispute—even
when the information is known to one or all of the parties to a
dispute. 345 Importantly, procedural, ethical, and economic
constraints all shape the information tribunals actually
receive. 346
341. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387
(1994) (“[W]e conclude that a lawyer has no ethical duty to inform an opposing
party that her client’s claim is time-barred; to the contrary, it may well be
unethical to disclose such information without the client’s consent.”).
342. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
343. AIG Haw. Ins. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996), amended
on reconsideration in part, 925 P.2d 373 (Haw. 1996); see, e.g., In re Fee, 898
P.2d 975, 979 (Ariz. 1995) (“The system cannot function as intended if
attorneys, sworn officers of the court, can . . . mislead judges in the guise of
serving their clients.”).
344. See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(5) (2003) (prohibiting
failure “to disclose to the tribunal a material fact knowing that the omission
is reasonably certain to mislead the tribunal, except that it shall not be a
breach of this rule if the disclosure is protected by a recognized privilege or is
otherwise prohibited by law”).
345. See supra Part II.E.
346. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt.
b. (2000) (“[An] advocate who knows of the evidence, and who has complied
with applicable rules concerning pretrial discovery and other applicable
disclosure requirements . . . has no legal obligation to reveal the evidence,
even though the proceeding thereby may fail to ascertain the facts as the
lawyer knows them.”).
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In some instances, all parties to the litigation might prefer
to avoid presenting courts with particular factual information
or arguments. Lawyers after all tend to operate in the interests
of their clients and not in the interest of helping a tribunal
develop the most accurate understanding. 347 This means that
tribunals will proceed without important material information
when it is not in any party’s interest to provide the information
and the law does not compel disclosure. Adding to the problem,
even when the ethics rules compel disclosure, attorneys will
only rarely face any repercussion for failing to disclose. 348
f.

Ex Parte Proceedings

The ethics rules impose an expanded duty of candor on
advocates in ex parte proceedings. The ABA’s Model Rules
instruct that in an ex parte proceeding “a lawyer shall inform
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or
not the facts are adverse.” 349
The comment to the Model Rule explains why disclosure is
required in ex parte proceedings. In an ordinary situation, “an
advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of
the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a
decision.” 350 In our adversarial system, “the conflicting position
is expected to be presented by the opposing party.” 351 Yet in ex
parte situations, such as a request for “a temporary restraining
order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing
advocates.” 352 Despite this, the comment instructs that the
347. See Humbach, supra note 340, at 995 (“Lawyers do not generally view
it as part of their professional role to be personally responsible for getting at
the truth of the matter but, rather, to persuade others to believe or accept
whatever interpretation of the raw evidence is most beneficial to the interests
of their own clients.”).
348. See Edwards, supra note 29, at 1491 (“In many instances, state bars
do not allocate substantial resources to their enforcement staff to investigate
complaints.”).
349. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(emphasis added).
350. Id. cmt. 14.
351. Id.
352. Id.
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object of the proceeding “is nevertheless to yield a substantially
just result.” 353 To accomplish this goal, it requires a lawyer for
the represented party “to make disclosures of material facts
known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes
are necessary to an informed decision.” 354
In describing a lawyer’s ethical obligations in ex parte
proceedings, the Restatement goes further and also prohibits
lawyers from presenting “evidence the lawyer reasonably
believes is false” and instructs lawyers to also comply with “any
other applicable special requirements of candor imposed by
law.” 355 The comment recognizes that the “potential for abuse is
inherent in applying to a tribunal in absence of an adversary.” 356
Identifying the situations where a lawyer must operate
under an expanded duty of candor remains challenging because
the ABA’s Model Rules do not define ex parte proceedings. 357
Although technical definition would exclude all cases where
some other party appears in the action, this would overly limit
the rule’s impact. One Idaho court read Idaho’s rule as applying
when one of the parties, after having received notice, failed to
appear in a proceeding. 358 It read the comment as suggesting
“that the application of the rule is not meant to hinge on a
technical definition of the term ex parte, but is instead intended
to ensure that the tribunal is informed of facts necessary to
render a just decision.” 359 It found that the underlying rationale
applied when “‘there is no balance of representation by opposing
advocates’” applied when one of the parties was simply absent
from a proceeding. 360

353. Id.
354. Id.
355. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 (2000).
356. Id. cmt. b.
357. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (2020) (failing to define ex
parte).
358. See In re Malmin v. Oths, 895 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Idaho 1995) (“The
judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just
consideration.”).
359. Id.
360. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 14 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020)).
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Policy rationales support extending the requirement
beyond purely technical situations. The Restatement recognizes
that in some special proceedings, “public policy requires
unusual candor from an advocate.” 361 It identifies child custody
proceedings, involuntary commitment proceedings, and class
action settlement proceedings. 362
Massachusetts also treats class action settlement
proceedings as quasi-ex parte proceedings requiring lawyers to
be fully candid with the court. The comment to its ethics rule
explains that when:
[A]dversaries present a joint petition to a tribunal, such as a
joint petition to approve the settlement of a class action suit
or the settlement of a suit involving a minor, the proceeding
loses its adversarial character and in some respects takes on
the form of an ex parte proceeding. 363

The Massachusetts rule recently played a significant role in
extended litigation arising out of a class action settlement before
a Massachusetts federal court. 364 After the court approved a
large class action settlement deal, it emerged that “$4,100,000
of the $75,000,000 fee award had been paid to Damon Chargois,
a lawyer in Texas who had done no work on the case, and whose
name was not disclosed to [the named plaintiff], the class, or the
court.” 365 Other problems emerged as well. Over 9,000 attorney
hours had been double counted. 366 It also appeared that
attorneys were billed at rates in excess of what hourly clients
ever paid. 367 Troubled by the revelation, the court ultimately
reduced class counsel’s fee award and explained the need for
361. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. c
(2000).
362. Id.
363. MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3. cmt. 14A (2015).
364. For a more thorough discussion of the case, see Edwards & Rickey,
supra note 39.
365. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr., 404 F. Supp. 3d 486,
492 (D. Mass. 2018).
366. See id. at 499 (“[D]ouble-counting resulted in inflating the number of
hours worked by more than 9,300.”).
367. See id. (“[S]taff attorneys involved in this case were typically paid
$25–$40 an hour . . . . [T]he regular hourly billing rates for the staff attorneys
were much higher—for example, $425.”).
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complete candor in class action settlement hearings because
“the adversary process does not operate and have the potential
to expose misrepresentations.” 368
2.

Expanded Duties

The professional ethics rules governing attorney conduct
assume that the attorney plays a defined role within a
functioning adversarial system. Yet incentives sometimes align
in ways that undercut this assumption within dispute
resolution systems. Ethics authorities might address the gap by
providing enhanced guidance for attorneys operating in these
types of proceedings. A practical expansion may be
accomplished by amendments to the ABA’s Model Rules or by
individualized efforts by states to address the issue. State bar
ethics opinions may also operate with some force to shift
behavior.
In circumstances where adversarial failure regularly
occurs, professional ethics rules should clearly and
unambiguously expand an attorney’s duties in ways designed to
increase the likelihood that a tribunal will render a
well-informed decision. An expanded disclosure duty may serve
to increase the likelihood that a tribunal will render a
reasonably informed decision. Practically, the duty must include
two distinct parts, an expanded duty of candor accompanied by
an affirmative obligation to investigate.
a.

An Expanded Duty of Candor

Ethics authorities could respond to adversarial failure by
requiring that attorneys operate under an expanded duty of
candor in situations that resemble ex parte proceedings in
substance, if not form. Massachusetts, at least, already
embraces this premise with its official comment recognizing
that when “adversaries present a joint petition to a tribunal,
such as a joint petition to approve the settlement of a class
action suit or the settlement of a suit involving a minor, the

368. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr., No. 11-10230, 2020
WL 949885, at *47 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2020).
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proceeding loses its adversarial character and in some respects
takes on the form of an ex parte proceeding.” 369
The same dynamic may apply whenever an adversary
simply opts not to contest an application for relief. Consider the
dynamic in expungement-only arbitrations brokers now file
against their employers. From an adjudicator’s perspective,
there may be little difference between a joint application and an
uncontested one. In each case, the adjudicator hears no
opposition and only views evidence from one party pushing it
toward a single outcome.
b.

An Expanded Duty to Investigate

Yet an expanded duty of candor alone will not suffice. To
avoid speaking any evil, attorneys may simply opt to hear and
see little other than what their client tells them. Tribunals
should not be deprived of reasonably accessible information
simply because a lawyer opts to shut her eyes to obvious lines of
inquiry.
A clear duty to conduct a reasonable investigation under the
circumstances may address this issue. In instances where
attorneys fail to disclose readily obtainable information to a
tribunal, protestations that the attorney was not aware of the
information should not remove all ethical liability. 370 This
obligation might reduce the incentive to seek expungements in
cases where readily available public information undercuts a
broker’s claims.
c.

Disclosure’s Limits

Changes to attorney ethics rules may do some real good, but
they certainly will not entirely solve the problems that flow from
attempting to resolve these issues through processes designed
for adversarial parties to resolve private disputes.
Disclosure-oriented reforms have not always shifted actual
369. MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3. cmt. 14A (2015).
370. Cf. Cohen, supra note 328, at 148 (suggesting that the ABA “add a
comment to the definition of knowledge stating that the knowledge
requirement does not negate or limit any duty to investigate or communicate
that otherwise exists, and that the deliberate breach of these duties can be
evidence of willful blindness and therefore knowledge”).
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conduct in adversarial proceeding. 371 Even substantive
disclosure requirements in securities class action litigation,
requiring repeat plaintiffs to disclose prior litigation have not
always generated expected disclosures. 372 Expanded ethical
guidance must be accompanied by some real enforcement
pressure to be effective.
Arbitration forums also present real challenges because the
reach of attorney ethics rules may depend on the state. New
York’s federal courts have found that representing a party in
arbitration does not qualify as the practice of law. 373 In contrast,
California treats arbitration as part of the practice of law. 374
As an alternative to state-by-state ethics changes, FINRA
could make rules applicable to all representative advocates
appearing in expungement hearings. It could enforce these rules
by suspending or permanently barring violators from pursuing
expungement relief for clients within its forum. This might
generate a significant incentive to disclose readily available
information that would be contrary to an expungement request.
As a number of firms specialize in pursuing expungement
requests for clients, the threat of losing access to the forum
would be significant enough to shift behavior.
C.

Adjudicator Responses

1.

An Appointed Advocate

Adjudicators may also respond to adversarial failure by
taking steps to restore adversarial scrutiny and increase the
371. See Edwards & Rickey, supra note 39, at 1566 (“Disclosure-based
reforms, however, have a limited track record of success and are unlikely to be
a panacea on their own.”).
372. See Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder
Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1089, 1135 (2013) (discussing absent disclosures in
securities class action litigation).
373. See Prudential Equity Grp. v. Ajamie, 538 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that under New York law, arbitration does not qualify
as the practice of law); see also Siegel v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera
Indus. y Comercial, No. 90 CIV. 6108 (RJW), 1991 WL 167979, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 19, 1991) (same).
374. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Super. Ct., 949 P.2d
1, 9 (Cal. 1998) (declining “to craft an arbitration exception to section 6125’s
prohibition of the unlicensed practice of law in this state”).
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likelihood of an informed decision. This idea has been raised
before. Special masters have been proposed as a response to
defects in class action settlement approval processes with one
justice suggesting appointing a “devil’s advocate” to raise
arguments against class action fee arrangements. 375 Delaware’s
vaunted Chancery Courts have also considered recruiting
assistances from an amicus curiae to overcome adversarial
breakdown. 376 The PIABA Foundation also suggested a reform
in this vein, arguing that “FINRA and/or the SEC create an
investor protection advocate (“Advocate”) that is independent
from FINRA to participate in every Expungement-Only case.” 377
These ideas have real merit and may increase the likelihood
that an adjudicator considering an expungement request will
make a reasonably informed decision. At the very least, regular,
experienced, and reasonably competent opposition would likely
discourage some of the worst abuses.
2.

Greater Control Over Process

Adjudicators could also take steps to mitigate adversarial
failure by taking greater control over the process. Consider the
benefits which might flow from adjudicators taking greater
control over notice processes. At present, advocates enjoy
substantial freedom to influence the notice process to increase
the likelihood that they will receive favorable outcomes. 378 An
adjudicator focused on increasing participation and surfacing
information would likely provide notice in a different way.
375. See Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 376 P.3d 672, 691 (Cal. 2016)
(Liu, J., concurring); see also William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing:
Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1475–77
(2006) (arguing for a devil’s advocate to evaluate substantive settlements in
class actions).
376. See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(“[I]t may be appropriate for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae to assist
the Court in its evaluation of the alleged benefits of the supplemental
disclosures, given the challenges posed by the non-adversarial nature of the
typical disclosure settlement hearing.”).
377. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 10.
378. See Humbach, supra note 340, at 995 (“While telling lies is definitely
out of bounds . . . trying to bend others’ perceptions to the client’s best
advantage is seen to be at the heart of good advocacy.”).
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Notices would be crafted to encourage participation. They would
be distributed repeatedly and with a substantial lead time
before any hearing. A notice aimed at increasing customer
participation would direct recipients to relevant information
about any available pro bono assistance.
Improved processes would also distribute notice about the
request more broadly to encompass all relevant stakeholders.
State and federal regulators might opt to appear at the
fact-finding stage if they were given notice and an invitation to
participate. Investors with claims currently pending against a
broker seeking an expungement might also opt to provide their
perspectives and experiences with the broker. Essentially,
adjudicators could shift the processes they use to solicit
additional information in ways designed to encourage
stakeholder participation.
3.

Eliminate Repeat Player Bias Risk

In the expungement context, FINRA might attempt to
eliminate the risk that arbitrators will favor industry interests
in expungement hearings by removing the ability for parties to
rank and strike arbitrators who hear expungement requests. To
its credit, FINRA has considered and its board has approved a
rule establishing a pool of arbitrators who receive additional
trainings for expungements. 379 As the rule proposal has not yet
been filed with the SEC, the precise contours of the rule remain
uncertain.
A roster with additional training alone seems unlikely to
substantially improve the process because selection effects will
remain significant. The arbitrator selection process now allows
brokers to cut known skeptics or arbitrators prone to asking too
many probing questions from their list. As many
expungement-only matters proceed without participation from
parties with an interest in a skeptical arbitrator, the selection
379. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 17–42 Expungement of
Customer Dispute Information 5 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/HB2Z-YAV3
(PDF) (requesting comments on the proposed changes); see also FIN. INDUS.
REG. AUTH., UPDATE: FINRA BD. OF GOVERNORS MEETING (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/ETT5-5S5W (noting that the Board had approved the
proposed changes).
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pressures strongly favor arbitrators who routinely grant
expungement requests. Removing the ability to rank and strike
arbitrators in expungement matters would substantially
mitigate this risk.
Importantly, the arbitrator roster for expungement matters
should serve exclusively on expungement matters. Maintaining
a limited, exclusive pool would generate real benefits. With a
smaller pool, the overall cost of providing significant training
would diminish. Setting the expungement roster aside from
other customer or industry cases would also mitigate other
selection pressures. The financial services industry always
participates in customer or industry disputes and remains a
repeat player, allowing it to accumulate knowledge about
arbitrators. This creates pressure for expungement arbitrators
to favor the industry to increase the likelihood they will be
selected for other matters. In contrast, customers with disputes
generally appear in the forum as single-shot players. Although
past
arbitration
results
are
disclosed
and
some
customer-claimant-side counsel operate as repeat players, the
industry will generally have more knowledge and
sophistication. The financial services industry always appears
in these arbitrations as a party while customers will only
sometimes secure representation from repeat player counsel.
Completely insulating an expungement arbitrator roster from
these selection pressures may do significant good.
Creating different rules for the expungement arbitrator
roster and making it an exclusive body may also shift the way
these arbitrators view their roles. In ordinary matters, the
parties jointly select an arbitrator to resolve a dispute primarily
concerning their interests. In expungement matters, the
arbitrators must serve as gatekeepers for the public’s interest
in maintaining access to information. Although setting them up
in this way falls far short of an alternative regulatory process,
it would likely do significant good.
IV. Conclusion
Our system of securities laws relies heavily on disclosure to
serve as disinfecting sunlight on the theory that when more
information comes out, it will enable better decisions. In our
dispute resolution systems, we expect adversarial processes, on
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balance, to surface information and provide adjudicators with
the information they need to make informed decisions. Yet these
assumptions do not always hold. As this article shows,
adversarial failure can leave adjudicators bereft of significant
information. When these processes facilitate the deletion of
public information, the failures affect society more broadly.
When it occurs, adversarial failure must be addressed to
protect the integrity of decisions affecting significant groups of
stakeholders. Although an ethics-oriented approach may shift
behavior to a degree, it cannot entirely solve the problem.
Ultimately, whenever adversarial failure occurs, society should
consider alternative methods for deciding issues which better
balance the interests at stake.

